


THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Bulletin

Vol. XXXVII, No. 954

October 7, 1957



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Major Issues Before the United Nations

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

It has been my great privilege to participate in the work of the United Nations since its beginning. I am happy today to continue that association by taking part in the general debate of this, the 12th, General Assembly.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The last year has seen the creation of an important new international agency—the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I recall, as will all of us who were here on December 8, 1953, the inspiring address of President Eisenhower. We must, he said, "find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death but consecrated to his life." To that end he proposed the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency.

To realize that vision has not been easy. There were serious initial obstructions. It has taken 4 years of patience, firmness, and diplomacy to achieve our goal. But now at last that goal is achieved.

Justice and Law

Other major activities of the United Nations during the past year have been in relation to Egypt and Hungary. I do not review these at this time, as they are fresh in the minds of all of us. However, I would recall that, when I discussed these matters at the first emergency session of the United Nations,² I referred to article 1 of our charter, which calls for peaceful settle-

ments "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law." I expressed here the hope that we might in the future do more to give vitality to that principle.

Unhappily, there is today much injustice in the world. The forcible partition of Germany is one injustice that comes instantly to mind.

There also seems to be reluctance on the part of many members to conform to article 36, which says that "legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice."

If there is any one thing that history demonstrates, it is that it is impossible to preserve peace indefinitely unless that peace is based upon justice and upon law.

Disarmament

I speak now of limitation of armament. It is one of the essential tasks which the charter lays upon the United Nations.

To limit armaments is at best a difficult task. The inherent difficulties are today intensified by acute distrust.

To make matters still more difficult, there are now in existence new weapons, the control of which cannot be assured by any scientific means. The Soviet Union has pointed out that it was impossible to preclude "the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons."³ Therefore, the Soviets concluded, "until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between States, any agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the vigilance of the

¹ Made before the U.N. General Assembly at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 19 (press release 529 revised).

² BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1956, p. 751.

³ Ibid., May 30, 1955, p. 904.

peoples. It will create a false sense of security, while in reality there will be . . . the threat of surprise attack." So speaks the Soviet Union.

We agree on the need for "an atmosphere of trust." But how shall we create it? One way is for the great military powers to demonstrate, by their conduct, that they live up to their pledges expressed in our charter. Unhappily, that basis for trust is lacking. I need only recall the Assembly's recent resolution dealing with the tragic fate of Hungary.

There is, however, another way to establish confidence; that is for the great military powers to accept such reciprocal inspection as will in fact make it unlikely that there could be the "surprise attack" of which the Soviet note spoke. Then we shall not have to trust each other's word or each other's intentions. Bad faith would be so vulnerable to detection that it would not become a profitable tactic even for those so inclined.

That is the concept which underlay President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal made at the "summit" conference. That concept instantly won worldwide acclaim, and it has been endorsed by this Assembly. It is the heart of the joint proposals which four of the five members of our Disarmament Subcommittee agreed upon last month.

The Joint Proposals

I shall briefly describe these joint proposals,⁴ for they will, no doubt, figure largely in the deliberations of this 12th Assembly.

1. The joint proposals would provide reciprocal inspection to safeguard against surprise attack. President Eisenhower had proposed this by aerial inspection. Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev had proposed land inspection. The joint proposals combine the two types of inspection.

With respect to the initial zones of inspection, the joint proposals offer the Soviets a wide choice. If they will permit inspection of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, they can have inspection of all areas from which the Soviet Union professes to fear attack, i.e., Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. There are a few United States bases in other areas, and, as I said at Geneva in 1955, the United States would not object to their also being opened to inspection.

If the Soviet Union prefers to start on only a

modest and experimental basis, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States unite to offer such an area in the north. Willingness is also expressed to have a small initial zone in Europe.

Thus the joint proposals deal with what all recognize to be the threshold difficulty, lack of trust and the danger of surprise attack.

2. The joint proposals then tackle the nuclear weapons problem. They provide (a) that no fissionable material shall ever again be produced for weapons purposes once an adequate control system is established and (b) that existing fissionable material, available for weapons, will be regularly reduced by transfers to nonweapons purposes.

Most experts, including those of the Soviet Union, agree that there is no dependable way to control existing stocks of fissionable material and to exclude their clandestine use. But we believe that it is possible to assure that no fissionable material hereafter produced shall be used for weapons purposes. That we propose to assure, and surely that is worth doing.

3. The joint proposals call for suspending the testing of nuclear weapons for 2 years and thereafter if other aspects of the program are moving forward as agreed.

4. The joint proposals would establish a study of outer space to the end that it shall be used only for peaceful and not for military purposes. The Soviet Union has announced that it had discovered ways to use outer space to wreak vast destruction anywhere. That is no new discovery. The United States, too, knows how that can be done. Our task is to see that it is not done.

5. The joint proposals would reduce the number of armed forces and put a part of the present stocks of armament into internationally supervised depots.

Testing

Mr. President, let me here say a few words about the much debated matter of testing.

We seek, by experiments now carefully controlled, to find how to eliminate the hazardous radioactive material now incident to the explosion of thermonuclear weapons. Also, we seek to make nuclear weapons into discriminating weapons, suitable for defense against attacking troops, submarines, and bombers, and for interception of intercontinental missiles.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

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⁵ *Ibid.*

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The Soviet Union seems not to want the character of nuclear weapons thus to be refined and changed. It seems to like it that nuclear weapons can be stigmatized as "horror" weapons.

Does it calculate that, under these conditions, governments subject to moral and religious influences will not be apt to use them? And would the Soviet Government, which itself is not subject to moral and religious restraints, thereby gain a special freedom of action and initiative as regards such weapons?

And does the Soviet Union not want nuclear weapons to be refined into effective defense weapons which could repel an aggressive attack by those who control the most manpower?

We want to reduce, to the maximum extent possible, the danger of surprise attack and thus the danger of war itself. We want, to the maximum extent possible, to stop the future use of fissionable material for weapons purposes. We want existing nuclear weapons stockpiles to start on their way downward. We want to end the risk that nuclear weapons will be spread promiscuously throughout the world, giving irresponsible persons a power for evil that is appalling even to contemplate.

But if the Soviet Union rejects inspection against surprise attack, if it rejects a worldwide system to end the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, if it rejects cooperation to prevent the promiscuous spreading of nuclear weapons throughout the world, if it refuses to start a reciprocal reduction of existing weapons stockpiles, then we doubt that it is prudent to forgo efforts to make nuclear weapons into discriminating defensive weapons substantially free of radioactive fallout.

Now, of course, our friends, it is essential that experimentation with nuclear weapons should not itself carry a threat to human life. The United States has a concern second to none in that matter.

We shall invite the United Nations to send observers to one of our next tests so that they can see how these tests are conducted.

Last March the United States and the United Kingdom joined to declare their intention to conduct nuclear tests only in such a manner as would keep world radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of what might be hazardous.⁵ Indeed, because each year a percentage of radioactivity dies away, we have reason to hope that

in the future any needed testing can be accomplished without any material raising whatsoever of the levels of radioactivity in the world.

The Soviet Attitude

The joint proposals which I describe derive from months, even years, of effort and discussion. They were formally submitted on August 29. The Soviet delegate instantly rejected them. He declared them a "sham." He went on to insist that the work of the subcommittee should be recessed, and he refused to agree on a date for the resumption of its task.

We cannot believe that that sweeping, almost contemptuous, Soviet rejection is final. Never before have so many nations, of so great military power, joined to make proposals so far-reaching. Any government that summarily rejects them would accept a frightful responsibility before all the world.

Humanity faces a tragic future if the war threat is not brought under control. It would mean that men, in order to survive, must learn to live as burrowers within the earth's surface to find protection against death. It would mean that man would be a slave to the rapidly mounting costs of an arms race. It would mean that individual freedom would give way to the requirements of bare survival.

The free-world members of the Disarmament Subcommittee reject that future. They accept what to some seem sacrifices, and to others risks, in order to chart a course which will reduce the danger of war, not just nuclear war but all war. Whether or not the Soviet Union today refuses to follow in that course, we can be confident that the enlightened effort that produced these proposals will not have been in vain. Even if the Soviet Union now rejects the joint proposals, those proposals should not on that account be regarded as dead. Their principles are valid and will live on.

The search for limitation of armament cannot be held in a state of suspense. Economic considerations alone require efforts to relieve the peoples of the terrible burden of armaments. Also there is need better to assure that the vast power which now resides in armaments shall serve only for security and never as an instrument of purely nationalistic policies.

There are today about 50 nations which have made collective defense pacts as authorized by our

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 8, 1957, p. 561.

charter. Such a framework is conducive to the development and application of these principles. For the very purpose of collective security is to enable each party to get more security with less armament. Already, for example, in Western Europe there is on the one hand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which calls for contributions to a common defense, and on the other hand the 1954 treaty for Western European Union, which provides for limitations upon national armaments.

If we cannot advance on a universal front, let the nations, wherever possible, draw closer together so that, within the limits of safety, we may relieve the burden and reduce the risks of armament.

But let us not fatalistically assume the Soviet response of last month is their last word. At first the Soviets rejected the proposal for an International Atomic Energy Agency, calling it a scheme which would serve only "aggressive forces." We persisted then. Let us persist now. If this organization will put the weight of its influence behind the principles of the joint proposals, it is not impossible that those principles will yet obtain universal acceptance. Since the stakes are so high, no chance, however slight, should be left untried.

The Middle East

Mr. President, I turn now to the Middle East, speaking first of a past we would all prefer to forget. But we dare not forget because, unhappily, the past lives in the present.

Russia's rulers have long sought domination in the Middle East. In 1940, when the Soviets were seeking a division of the world with Hitler, they stipulated that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."

In the immediate postwar period the Soviets prolonged their military occupation of Iran; they sought trusteeship over Libya, and they fomented subversion against Greece.

Between 1945 and 1949, however, Central Europe became the principal theater of Soviet activities.

In 1949, after the Marshall plan and the North Atlantic Treaty, the Soviets shifted their principal efforts to the Far East. There they supported the Communist revolution in China, the war in Korea, and the war in Indochina.

In 1955, after the United Nations' successful

defense of Korea and the making of the Southeast Asia and other defensive pacts, the Soviet rulers again made the Middle East the center of their external efforts. This time they tried to use, in Arab countries, the technique that Stalin and Lenin had prescribed for bringing about the "amalgamation"—that is their word—of the so-called "colonial and dependent peoples" into the Soviet orbit. This technique, as Lenin specified, involves inciting nationalism to break all ties with the West and thus create so total a dependence upon the Soviet Union that it can take full control.

So, in 1955, the Soviet rulers began intensive propaganda designed to incite the Arab nations to believe that with Soviet arms, with Soviet technicians, and with Soviet political backing they could accomplish extreme nationalistic ambitions.

This Soviet Communist effort has made progress in Syria. There Soviet-bloc arms were exultantly received and political power has increasingly been taken over by those who depend upon Moscow. True patriots have been driven from positions of power by arrests or intimidation.

One consequence of this is that Turkey now faces growing military dangers from the major buildup of Soviet arms in Syria on its southern border, a buildup concerted with Soviet military power on Turkey's northern border. Last week the Soviet Union sought to intimidate Turkey from making internal dispositions of its own security forces.

The "Essentials of Peace"

I turn now to recall the position of this organization with respect to so-called indirect aggression. In 1949 the General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "Essentials of Peace."⁶ The resolution calls upon every nation "To refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence, or integrity of any state." When this resolution was voted upon, the only nations voting "no" were the five Soviet-bloc states.

The United States has consistently supported the "Essentials of Peace" and has done so specifically in relation to the Middle East.

In 1947, when international communism was seeking to take over Greece and threatening Turkey, President Truman said, "totalitarian regimes

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1949, p. 807.

imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace.”⁷

When the Soviet threat to the Middle East was recently resumed, the Congress of the United States, by joint resolution, declared that “the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.”⁸ It authorized the President to give economic and military assistance to help the nations of the Middle East to remain independent. It also says, “. . . The United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.”

On September 7, 1957, President Eisenhower called attention to the danger in Syria and reaffirmed his intention to “exercise, as needed” the authority given him by that congressional resolution.⁹

The Soviet Communists appear to be engaging in “acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity” of certain Near East nations in violation of our United Nations “Essentials of Peace” resolution. Also, we believe that these Soviet acts may, perhaps unwittingly, lead the recipients of Soviet arms into acts of direct aggression. Those who feel an abnormal sense of power, as a result of the recent putting into their hands of large amounts of Soviet-bloc arms, are being incited against their

neighbors by violent propaganda. That is risky business.

Of course, in this situation the primary responsibility rests upon the member nations themselves. It is they who should abstain from acts of aggression, direct or indirect. It is they who have an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Nothing that the United Nations can do should relax for one moment the vigilance and efforts of each free nation to maintain the genuine integrity and independence of itself and of every other free nation.

Nevertheless, when there is such a situation as now exists in the Middle East, this General Assembly ought at least to consider it and to discuss it. Discussion, as our charter suggests, may of itself be salutary. The United States reserves the right, in the light of that discussion, to introduce concrete proposals.

Mr. President and fellow delegates, it is a tragedy that the Middle East, so rich in culture and tradition and contributing so greatly to the material and spiritual welfare of all the world, should be distraught, as it is today. The United States stands ready to contribute generously to the economic development of the area under conditions which will promote and strengthen the freedom and independence of the nations. This prospect of enlarged freedom and well-being will, however, never be realized so long as the area is looked upon as a subject of conquest and as a potential base for the domination of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The United Nations may not be able, by any material power that it can muster, to tranquilize the scene. But we can exert our influence. May we at least do that and thereby once again serve the cause of peace, hope, and happiness.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1947, p. 534.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1957, p. 487.

The United Nations: Its Issues and Responsibility

by Francis O. Wilcox

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

It is always heartwarming to meet with old friends on the eve of a momentous event. It is particularly true on this occasion—only 2 days before the opening of the 12th General Assembly.

The American Association for the United Nations and the other nongovernmental organizations represented here have given sustained and vigorous support to the United Nations. You have contributed a great deal to a fuller understanding in this country of the importance of the United Nations to all of us. We must never forget that public understanding of the United Nations is absolutely essential to its effectiveness. I congratulate you for the splendid job you are doing.

The fact that the Congress did not reduce our contributions to any of our United Nations programs for next year is a tribute to your deep interest in the organization and the solid support of the American people for it.

All of us have reason today for particular encouragement, in that the United States is sending one of its strongest delegations² to one of the most significant meetings of the General Assembly in United Nations history. Under the tireless and able leadership of Ambassador Lodge, the United States team represents this country in the widest sense. Its members come from diverse walks of life—the legislative and executive branches of government, law and labor, education and the arts. We can be assured of a forceful and productive representation of United States interest at this forthcoming session of the Assembly.

¹ Address made before the American Association for the United Nations at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 15 (press release 519 dated Sept. 14).

² BULLETIN of Sept. 9, 1957, p. 443.

The New Role of the General Assembly

The current problems of the Assembly can best be reviewed against a background of its changing role. This is particularly true with respect to the Assembly's increasing responsibilities. Events of the past year, perhaps more than any other, have underlined this significant change. They clearly underscore the fact that the United Nations today has emerged a different organization from that conceived in 1945 at San Francisco.

The architects of the charter vested in the Security Council the power and responsibility to maintain and restore world peace. This power and responsibility dovetailed neatly with one another, at least in theory. However, over a decade of cold war the increasingly deep cleavages between the Soviet orbit and the free world, and in particular the endless abuse of the veto by the U.S.S.R., have seriously crippled the role of the Security Council for the time being.

If increasing disuse has characterized the Security Council, the opposite is true of the General Assembly. Unlike the Council, it was created only to recommend, not to decide. It was designed as a forum—a town meeting of the world—where member nations could air the conflicts arising from their varied interests and aspirations. Its founding fathers did not attempt to provide representation in the Assembly to member states on the basis of their power or interest in world affairs.

Today the General Assembly has grown from 51 to 81 member countries. It will soon have 82 when the newly independent Federation of Malaya becomes a member.³ We welcome Malaya into the

³ Malaya became a member of the U.N. on Sept. 17.

family of free nations. And we are particularly gratified that Malaya achieved its independence through peaceful negotiation with the United Kingdom under circumstances of high statesmanship on both sides.

Most of the growth of the Assembly, as you are aware, consists of the membership of newly sovereign nations in Africa and Asia. It reflects the increasing importance of these developing countries, and rightly so. For their legitimate interests and aspirations cannot and will not be ignored in the present scheme of things. The increasing urge for greater freedom and independence is one of the central facts of the contemporary world. The United States intends to continue to encourage these legitimate aspirations both within and outside the United Nations and to contribute toward their achievement through the orderly processes of peaceful change.

The enlargement and changed composition of the Assembly, along with its increasingly important role, has broad implications for the future. Able students of world affairs are pondering whether the Assembly can effectively face up to the critical issues which confront it. Can justice and fair play really be achieved in a body such as the General Assembly, they ask? Or is it too unwieldy and too susceptible to political pressures? Let us briefly examine some of these fears and criticisms.

Criticisms of the General Assembly

It is often contended that the General Assembly is tending more and more toward bloc voting and that this is a dangerous development because of possible misuse of political power. I suggest to these critics that the only really consistent bloc voting in the Assembly is done by the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states.

In practice, the states of Africa and Asia do not vote as a bloc. When they do, it is ordinarily on issues for which there is overwhelming support from other states as well. Such was the case, for example, on the resolutions relating to the Middle East crisis at the 11th session.

We ought to be perfectly candid about it; we do ourselves and the United Nations a disservice when we refer to the Afro-Asian bloc. To be sure, these states do have some things in common. But no one can deny that, when taken as a whole, the differences between them—in history, language, cul-

ture, and political thinking—are very great indeed. It would be surprising if they were to vote as a bloc on most issues before the Assembly.

Some critics also complain that resolutions are often watered down in order to get a two-thirds vote. I do not have to tell this audience a resolution is seldom approved in committee in the form in which it was first submitted—not even in our own Congress. The process of compromise, the attempt to find common ground and secure wide support for it, is a truly democratic process. As Edmund Burke put it in his famous address on conciliation with America: "All government,—indeed, every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act,—is founded on compromise and barter."

An excellent example of the effectiveness of this process was the Assembly's handling of the Algerian problem in its last session.⁴ A moderate compromise resolution was introduced. It expressed the hope that a peaceful, democratic, and just solution to the Algerian problem could be found in conformity with the principles of the charter. The resolution was unanimously adopted. This, I suppose, could be cited as an example of a watered-down resolution. It would be far more accurate in my view to describe it as a practical compromise arrived at after extensive debate in which all sides had an opportunity to air their views.

Another complaint is that the vote of a small, economically and politically weak state weighs equally with that of a large and strong nation, with the result that a group of small countries can "gang up" on the large ones. When a nation first gains its independence, one of its first actions is to apply for admission to the United Nations. Membership in this body is regarded as the final stamp of approval by the international community. Once admitted, it is only natural that the new nation is eager to demonstrate its ability to contribute to United Nations objectives and to assert its newly found independence. By and large, I believe that these newly sovereign states and the so-called small or weak nations have acted responsibly and in the common interest.

There is every reason for them to do so. Being weak, they lean upon the United Nations. They look upon it as the special guardian of their in-

⁴ BULLETIN of Mar. 11, 1957, p. 421.

terests. I cannot believe they would take irresponsible action and thus impair the usefulness of the organization that protects them and gives them an equal voice in the councils of nations.

Others contend that the General Assembly has a so-called "double standard" of justice and morality, one for the states which abide by its recommendations and another for those which defy them. The failure of the General Assembly to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary as contrasted with its success in the Middle East conflict has been cited as an example of this "double standard."

The record of Assembly action on these two issues, in my opinion, does not support these charges. The resolutions invoked against the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Communist regime were actually more strongly worded than in the case of the action in the Middle East. The Assembly climaxed its action with outright condemnation of the U.S.S.R.

The difference in results lay in the attitude of states. President Eisenhower succinctly described this difference in his address to a joint session of Congress last January⁵ when he declared:

The United Nations was able to bring about a ceasefire and withdrawal of hostile forces from Egypt because it was dealing with governments and peoples who had a decent respect for the opinions of mankind as reflected in the United Nations General Assembly. But in the case of Hungary the situation was different. The Soviet Union vetoed action by the Security Council to require the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Hungary. And it has shown callous indifference to the recommendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly.

Therefore, if there is a "double standard" in the U. N., it is not a "double standard" in the sense of judging violations of the charter but rather in terms of how the parties involved respond to the judgment of world opinion.

Issues Confronting the 12th General Assembly

Against this background of the changed role of the Assembly and the problems inherent in its "growing pains," I would now like to review some of the major issues which will confront the General Assembly in the forthcoming session.

Significant changes in the power structure of the Soviet Union have occurred in the past year.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1957, p. 83.

Former Premier Malenkov has been exiled to a remote Soviet power plant. Mr. Molotov, the once powerful Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., has been assigned to oblivion as Ambassador to Outer Mongolia. His successor, Mr. Shepilov, and Mr. Kaganovich, another former member of the Kremlin's high command, also have gotten their walking papers.

There is an ancient Chinese proverb to the effect that "he who rides a tiger finds it difficult to dismount." For some time now the truth of this proverb has been painfully evident to the leaders in the Kremlin.

Hungary

Definitive analysis of the import of these changes would be premature. They could mean eventually a more favorable international climate. Or they could mean more Stalinism. Whichever may be correct, the Soviet Union remains unwilling to alleviate the tragedy of Hungary.

History may show that what took place in Hungary last autumn was one of the most significant developments since the close of World War II. It showed conclusively, even more than the free world dared to believe, how deeply the captive peoples of Eastern Europe resent the rule of the Soviet Union. In time the Soviet Union may itself come to recognize that it is in its own national interest to permit its satellites a greater degree of independence. Otherwise, as the Hungarian people have demonstrated, the Soviets must accept the possibility that bitter and hostile people held captive in Eastern Europe may turn against them the instant the chance presents itself.

The present uneasy situation in Hungary must give considerable concern to the Kremlin. It has been nearly a year since peaceful student demonstrations in Budapest mushroomed into a nationwide uprising. The efforts of the Hungarian people to achieve independence inspired sympathy and support throughout the world. At the very moment of fulfillment the Soviet Union intervened with armed forces. There can be no question as to what would have happened in the absence of Soviet intervention. The people of Hungary would be free today.

The United Nations was seized with the Hungarian problem from the outset of the revolution. It demanded an end to hostilities, the withdrawal

of Soviet troops, and proclaimed the right of the people of Hungary to a government of their own choice. The Soviet Union and the puppet Hungarian authorities flagrantly defied the resolutions of the Assembly.

Last January the Assembly established a Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. Its report, unanimously agreed to by its five members, who came from Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, is perhaps the most remarkable document ever issued by the United Nations.⁶ Not only is it an outstanding historical document, but it presents the facts in a straightforward fashion and draws conclusions that are unassailable. No one now can contend, against the weight of the Committee's report, that what happened in Hungary was inspired by forces outside that country. Nor can one blur the grim facts of Soviet armed intervention to impose upon the people of Hungary a regime that would do the Kremlin bidding.

The 11th session of the Assembly was reconvened on September 10 to consider the Special Committee's report. In the frank and inspiring discussion which took place the vast majority of the United Nations members joined forces in approving a resolution that reiterates past calls of the General Assembly upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its armed forces from Hungary and which points the way toward an eventual solution.⁷ Many delegations believed that the prospect of progress would be greater if the Assembly were to appoint a special representative of outstanding eminence to pursue its objectives on the Hungarian question. Prince Wan, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Thailand and the President of the 11th session of the Assembly, has been named to this important post.

We all regret, of course, that the action taken by the United Nations has not brought about an immediate improvement of conditions in Hungary. Let us remember, however, that the United Nations took every measure possible short of force. Its actions stand today as the agreed consensus of the world community as to the nature of the events in Hungary and what should be done to change the

situation. It was the clear duty of the United Nations to do all within its power to bring about the relief of the troubles of the people of Hungary. Progress in this respect can be made if the Soviet Union, which exercises military and political power in Hungary, responds to the judgment of world opinion.

Of course, the Assembly cannot force the Soviet Union to comply, but in the long run it is my conviction that the events in Hungary, the action taken in the United Nations to meet them, and the subsequent exposure of the policies and actions of the Soviet Union mark the beginning of the end of communism's appeal. No one can read the report of the Committee on Hungary, listen to the shallow Soviet efforts to defend their actions, and watch the desperate efforts of the puppet Hungarian Government to restore order, and still believe that communism pursues policies in the interests of the common man.

The Middle East

Throughout the past year diplomats of the world have probably spent more time on the Middle East than on any other set of problems. While there is no item on the agenda of the forthcoming Assembly which deals with overall Middle East problems, various aspects of this explosive issue are certain to be reflected in the Assembly's discussions and debate. For example, the Assembly will consider the urgent problem of financial support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and its effort to alleviate the plight of the Palestine refugees. Member states will also be confronted with the question of determining appropriate means of reimbursement of nations who assisted in the clearing of the Suez Canal. Finally, the Assembly will have to face up to the problem of providing additional financial resources to assure the continuation of the United Nations Emergency Force in its role as the guardian of the peace in the Middle East.

The Middle East crisis illustrates what the United Nations is able to do when the nations involved have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. The simple fact is that in all probability a major war was avoided in the Middle East because the United Nations acted promptly and effectively.

What were the results of this United Nations action?

⁶ For text of final chapter of report, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1957, p. 63.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1957, p. 515.

(1) The menace of war has receded and peace—admittedly an uneasy peace—has been created in the area.

(2) The standing of the United States in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East has been increased. By our firm adherence to the charter, the nations of the world now know that the United States stands on the side of principle.

(3) Britain, France, and Israel, by heeding the recommendations of the General Assembly, proved themselves sensitive to the call of world opinion. This came at a time when the Soviet Union was behaving in precisely the opposite manner.

(4) A truly international police force was mobilized and sent to the scene of the trouble. It is now on guard, helping to keep the uneasy truce that prevails.

The United States acted promptly to deal with the emergency created by the outbreak of violence in the Middle East. We must move ahead to help find solutions to the difficult problems which caused the conflict.

This is no time for us to have a smug feeling about the limited successes achieved. The shooting is over, but the basic causes that gave rise to the shooting must be dealt with if peace is to prevail.

One important element of peace in the Middle East is the early solution of the problem of the more than 900,000 Palestine refugees who rely on United Nations help for subsistence and housing. Admittedly the matter is an urgent one. But the problem is so complex and so explosive politically that possible steps must be considered carefully if they are to improve rather than worsen the situation. Nor can the boundaries between Israel and her neighbors—a sore which has been festering for a decade—be satisfactorily adjusted overnight.

The Middle East remains a tinder box where rash and ill-considered action could have serious results. We can take it for granted that the Soviet Union will continue to fish in troubled waters.

There continues to be a pall of fear hanging over the heads of the Arab and Israeli people alike. We must therefore push ahead with a patient vigor. We must do everything possible to develop a will to peace in the Middle East. Without such a will, a settlement of the long-range problems cannot be achieved.

Disarmament

There are few subjects reported in the press which leave well-informed citizens more confused than the subject of disarmament. The term itself invites confusion because it is not disarmament we are seeking but rather progress in the control of armaments which will reduce the threat of war.

As you know, the discussions of the Disarmament Subcommittee in London have recessed without agreement. The lack of agreement which brought about the recess of the talks was due almost entirely to a sudden shift on the part of the Soviet Union from an attitude of comparative reasonableness to one of extreme rigidity. However, it is encouraging to note that both the Western powers and the Soviet Union were able to make some major accommodations to the position of the other and come somewhat closer than they had been able to come before on the details of a settlement.

The Subcommittee report⁸ has just been submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Commission. We hope that the discussion and debate in the coming Assembly session based on a review of this record will induce the U.S.S.R. to relax its rigid position and reinforce our efforts to move toward agreement.

Our position on disarmament is not quite so complex as some seem to believe. In a nutshell it is basically this:

First. We believe that small steps taken now will materially reduce the chance of nuclear war. For example, a degree of inspection as a start would make it very difficult for either side to launch a major surprise attack. Without this ability, neither side would be tempted to begin all-out war. With this in mind we have proposed certain possible zones of inspection which offer alternatives either of all of the United States, Canada, and the U.S.S.R. or smaller trial inspection zones in the Arctic and in Europe.

Second. We wish to divert future output of fissile material into peaceful uses. Even now we are beginning to transfer some of our existing stockpiles of this material to such purposes. We propose that all nuclear powers take similar steps on a proportionate basis.

Third. To carry out these steps we propose a 2-year suspension of nuclear weapons tests while

⁸ U.N. doc. DC/113 dated Sept. 11.

a monitoring system for tests and an inspection system for the other nuclear proposals is being established.

Fourth. We hope to limit indiscriminate acquisition of nuclear weapons throughout the world through limitation of production, testing, and transfer of nuclear weapons. The fewer the countries which have atomic bombs, the less difficult is the problem of control.

Fifth. We would agree to reduce our armed forces to 2.5 million men in a first stage if the Soviets would do the same. Moreover, we have indicated our willingness to consider levels of 2.1 million and 1.7 million men in later stages. We would, of course, have to take into account progress on the settlement of major political problems before extensive reductions could be undertaken.

Sixth. Finally we propose that steps be taken to insure that missiles or other objects fired into outer space are being used only for peaceful purposes. We believe that it is essential that any agreement, on this or other phases of our proposals, should include a foolproof system of inspection. We cannot rely on mere promises.

You may question whether there are any risks to the security of the United States and the free world in our proposal. Secretary Dulles provided the best answer to that question last July when he said:⁹

It may be asked whether the steps we now propose can be taken without any risk that hostile forces may gain advantage for themselves. In all frankness it must be admitted that, after all foreseeable risks are considered, there may be other risks that we cannot foresee. But this can be said with assurance: The risks of seeking to move forward are far less than the risks of being frightened into immobility.

The whole world faces a grim future if the war threat is not brought under some international control. Mankind cannot long live under the shadow of such destruction as is now possible, without great changes in existing physical, social, political, and moral values.

The Soviet Union has given an impression of wanting to negotiate seriously on disarmament. However, thus far, they have balked at accepting an effective inspection system, with one exception.

This exception relates to the testing of atomic bombs. The Soviet Union's position, briefly stated, is this: Let us halt all tests. We will allow

you to station observers in our country to make sure that we stand by our word.

To this proposal we must give a negative reply. Before we agree to ban testing, we insist that all future production of fissionable materials which constitute the makings of nuclear weapons should be diverted to peaceful uses. And, in order to make sure that no future production is used for making weapons, we must have the right of mutual inspection in each other's factories.

Now, why do we insist on these conditions? Why not simply agree to ban the bomb? Certainly everyone would be better off if there were no more testing of these ultimate weapons of destruction. The fact is that we are willing to stop testing. But we will agree to halt these tests only if we are assured that the Soviet Union will not then begin to amass stockpiles of bombs. After all, our superiority in both the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons is our main insurance against aggression. Consequently, if we are asked to abandon testing, the source of our qualitative advantage, then certainly we are justified in demanding that the quantity of weapons be controlled thereafter. This, of course, would be achieved by means I have mentioned earlier, that is, the earmarking of all future fissionable materials for peaceful uses for the benefit of mankind.

International Atomic Energy Agency

The subject of disarmament has obscured to a large extent a development of vital importance to mankind. Only recently the Senate approved the atoms-for-peace treaty. With this approval, President Eisenhower's bold concept of an international agency which would have responsibility for the sharing by mankind of the benefits of atomic energy is now coming to fruition.

This question is not on the agenda of the General Assembly. I refer to it, however, because of the important impact it may have on the disarmament problem.

When a state receives assistance from the Agency, it must agree to adequate safeguards. The Agency must approve the means by which used nuclear fuels are processed. Complete records must be kept by receiving nations and progress reports made to the Agency. Moreover, in order to make certain that fissionable materials made avail-

⁹ BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1957, p. 267.

able to a given country are not diverted to military use, international inspectors will have free access at all times to all places, data, and persons involved with the Agency projects.

This is the heart of the statute.¹⁰ For the first time in history, a large number of states have declared their willingness to admit international inspectors within their boundaries in the larger interests of world peace and security. This is a breakthrough of real significance for the future.

There is one other point I ought to mention in passing. Some people have been seriously disturbed lest our relations with the new Agency be hampered by congressional restrictions and limitations. This concern stems from the fact that, under the law providing for our participation in the Agency, congressional approval, in general, will be necessary for the transfer of nuclear materials from the United States to the Agency.

No one can doubt that Congress could, if it chose to do so, completely hamstring our relations with the Agency. I am confident this will not be done. I believe the legislative history clearly demonstrates the intent of Congress to insure full U.S. participation in this Agency in keeping with the spirit of President Eisenhower's original initiative and that Congress intends to be reasonable in its application of the new law. Moreover, I am convinced that there is such strong support for the program, both in Congress and among the American people, as to guarantee good working relations between the Agency and the United States.

Communist China and the U.N.

We can be sure that the Soviets will once again press for the seating of Communist China in the U.N. You can be equally sure that the United States will continue to make every effort to maintain the representation of the Republic of China. Last year the vote was 47 to 24 in favor of our position. This year I believe that the Assembly, by an equally large margin of votes, will again agree to postpone consideration of the matter.

On this question our position is unequivocally clear. Time after time Congress, mindful of the aggressiveness of Communist China, has unanimously expressed its opposition to the seating of that regime in the various organs and agencies

of the U.N. These votes reflect the sentiment of the American people and the Government of the United States.

Reappointment of the Secretary-General

You will have noted, I am sure, that the Assembly will consider during this session the question of the reappointment of the Secretary-General. Secretary-General Hammarskjold deserves the gratitude of millions of people the world over for his able leadership during the Middle East crisis of last year. The U.N. is indeed fortunate to have at its helm a servant so dedicated to peace and mankind. He has applied himself imaginatively, resourcefully, and unstintingly in support of the principles of the charter. He has the full confidence of the United States Government and its people. We favor his early reappointment for another 5-year term.

Other Issues

Thus far I have dwelt on various political issues before the General Assembly. But we must not lose sight of the crucial role of the United Nations in other areas.

In the economic field the U.N., through the Economic and Social Council and the work of the Assembly's Economic Committee, is pressing ahead on the vital task of helping to raise living standards and improve the general welfare of peoples in many lands. The problem of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) will again loom large. For reasons we have often stated, we do not believe that the time has come for the establishment of SUNFED.¹¹ Soviet intransigence in opposing any effective disarmament measures have made the establishment of such a fund at this time impractical.

However, the United States already is on record as favoring a modest increase in the technical assistance program. It remains our hope that steps can soon be taken which would extend and strengthen this program as a basis for increased private and public investment on a national and international scale.

The Human Rights Commission and the Assembly's Social Committee continue to attack the un-

¹⁰ For text of statute, see *ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1956, p. 820.

¹¹ For a statement by Nell H. Jacoby in the U.N. Economic and Social Council, see *ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1957, p. 502.

derlying social conditions which give rise to instability and tension. Progress in the social field remains painfully slow, particularly in the field of human rights. And this is apt to be so as long as millions under Soviet tyranny are denied basic human freedoms.

The Trusteeship Council and the Trusteeship Committee of the Assembly are making real progress in channeling constructively and gradually the legitimate national aspirations of many for self-government either as independent states or in association with other nations. One of the most significant chapters of our time is the creation of independent states from colonial areas. Most of these new states are now members of the United Nations, comprising over 600 million people whose newly found dignity and freedom is expressing itself in our counsels and deliberations. The termination of the U.N. trusteeship over British Togoland and the incorporation of that trust territory, by its own freely expressed will, in a newly independent Ghana constitutes a notable achievement.

The Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the Assembly will tackle the difficult problem of mounting costs. Once again members will have to face up to the prospect of an increasing budget. It will cost more to operate the secretariat. It will take more money to maintain the United Nations Emergency Force. Peace is costly, but war is infinitely more costly. Member states will have to recognize this fact more fully than ever as the 12th Assembly reviews its budget.

The United States will renew its efforts in the Committee for reduction in its percentage share of the regular U.N. budget. With the membership increased from 51 to 81, we believe it is only reasonable that the share of the largest contributor should be reduced below the 33½ percent ceiling which has governed our contribution in the past.

The Legal Committee of the Assembly will also have important work before it. If it can encourage states toward greater use of judicial processes and a greater respect for the rule of law in the world, real progress toward peace will have been made.

Concluding Comments

I look optimistically to the future of the United Nations and of the role of the General Assembly in it. It has faced crucial issues and has emerged

a stronger and in many ways a more mature organization.

In this connection may I say just a word about the problem of charter review. As you know, the special committee created to study this matter will recommend that the Assembly defer for the time being a decision as to when and where a charter review conference should be held.

I hasten to add that the United States Government has not changed its mind about the desirability of convening such a conference at the appropriate time. We believe in the United Nations, and we want to do what we can to strengthen that organization as an instrumentality of world peace.

When the time seems more auspicious, therefore, we shall press forward with our recommendation that a charter review conference be convened. Such a conference could consider not only formal amendments to the charter but should review in some detail the experience of the United Nations and make recommendations for its more effective functioning.

For example, the Secretary-General in his recent report comments that there is need for a careful analysis of the United Nations Emergency Force experience in order to give the U.N. a sound foundation for action in future emergencies. Steps are already being taken in the secretariat to carry out such a study. I welcome this study, for the UNEF experience has been a fruitful one from which many valuable lessons can be learned.

Meanwhile, at least two charter amendments should be approved without undue delay. In 12 years' time, some 30 new members have been admitted to the United Nations. This influx of new members has not been accompanied by any increase whatsoever in the size of the Security Council. The Asian countries, who do not have a seat on the Council they can call their own, have never been adequately represented. By the same token, the increase in European members calls for a review of the number of seats allocated to that region of the world. It would appear that at least two nonpermanent seats should be added to the Council in order to redress the imbalance that has developed over the years. Moreover, we believe that an increase of four members on the Economic and Social Council is both reasonable and desirable.

Had the nations of the world been forced to live the past 11 years without a common meeting place, without the basic rules by which they should conduct themselves, without the machinery for peaceful settlement of international differences, without a place to air disputes and seek agreements, the world might not have survived these 12 years. The stresses and strains have been so great, the ideological conflict so sharp, and the destructive power of weapons available so immense, that without the unifying power of the United Nations we could have by this time destroyed ourselves.

For its part, the United States will continue to contribute its full measure of support to the United Nations. We set our hand to the plow at San Francisco in 1945. We shall not turn back.

10th Anniversary of Death of Nikola Petkov

Press release 536 dated September 20

September 23, 1957, marks the 10th anniversary of the execution of the Bulgarian patriot Nikola Petkov by the Communist regime of Bulgaria. One of the Bulgarian leaders who signed the armistice in 1944, he helped to end his country's alliance with Nazi Germany and played a leading role in establishing a democratic coalition government. He was a defender of freedom and a champion of the rights of his fellow Bulgarians. His imprisonment and tragic death allowed the forces against which he fought to gain control in Bulgaria.

The spirit of Nikola Petkov still lives. His devotion to the cause of democracy is an inspiration to his countrymen and to all who love freedom. His name is an enduring symbol of hope to his people and a source of pride and solace to them in this period of trial.

General Pulaski's Memorial Day

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS, soon after the adoption of our Declaration of Independence, Count Casimir Pulaski, a Polish patriot, came from across the seas to join our army of freedom; and

WHEREAS, he quickly distinguished himself in battle; was made Brigadier General by the Continental Congress and formed the cavalry Legion which bore his name; and


WHEREAS on October 9, 1779, while leading his troops in an attempt to divide the enemy forces at Savannah, he received a grievous wound from which he died two days later, thus sacrificing a young life which gave promise of further contributions to the cause of liberty; and

WHEREAS, in acknowledgment of our debt to General Pulaski for his valorous conduct in our War for Independence, it is fitting that we pay tribute to his memory on the one hundred and seventy-eighth anniversary of his death:

Now, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Friday, the eleventh day of October, 1957, as General Pulaski's Memorial Day; and I invite the people of this Nation to observe the day with appropriate commemorative ceremonies. I also direct that the flag of the United States be displayed on all Government buildings on that day in honor of the memory of General Casimir Pulaski.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twelfth day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-seven, and of the Independence of the [SEAL] United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.



By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3201; 22 Fed. Reg. 7415.

Challenge and Response in United States Policy

by Secretary Dulles¹

The 35th anniversary of the founding of *Foreign Affairs* is a suitable occasion for comment on the evolution of United States foreign policy and the role we can play today in accord with our enduring national principles. During this third of a century, the American people have altered their conception as to the proper part which their Government should take in world affairs.

Since the founding of this nation, the American people have believed that it had a mission in the world. They have believed that "their conduct and example" ("The Federalist," No. 1) would influence events throughout the world and promote the spread of free institutions. But they have traditionally felt that it would be better for their Government to avoid involvement in international issues. So, with rare exceptions, the United States left the field of international politics to the governments of the "great powers" of the 19th century.

It took the First World War to bring us into major involvement in world crises and conflicts. Then in the decade of the thirties a series of critical events culminated in the greatest of all wars. By its end, a transformation had been effected. It had become obvious that the conduct and example of our people no longer, alone, sufficed to prevent recurrent challenges to our security and our way of life. It was also apparent that only in association with others could we repel such challenges. Furthermore, our national power had grown to be so impressive as to preclude its being merely a reserved, negative force.

Thus, since 1945, our Government has played

a leading role in a coalition of free nations dedicated to the principles of international order to which our people have long subscribed.

There still remains a nostalgia for the "good old days." This is reinforced by recurrent demonstrations that, great as is our strength, we are not omnipotent. We cannot, by fiat, produce the kind of a world we want. Even nations which depend greatly upon us do not always follow what we believe to be the right course. For they are independent nations and not our satellites. Our power and policy are but one significant factor in the world in which we live. In combination with other factors we are able to influence importantly the course of events. But we cannot deal in absolutes. This, to many Americans, is a source of worriment.

The American people may not yet have completely accepted the role that history has made inevitable. But at least a good beginning has been made. It is unlikely that there could now be a successful effort to withdraw the United States Government from official and active participation in international affairs. But in order that such participation should command popular support, our foreign policies should be more than politics. They must evidently reflect the traditional aspirations of our people.

II. COMMUNIST HOSTILITY

United States foreign policy since 1945 has been forced to concern itself primarily with one major threat to the peaceful and orderly development of the kind of international community the American people desire. This is the threat posed by those who direct the totalitarian system of international communism. Because orthodox communism rep-

¹ Article prepared for publication in the October issue of *Foreign Affairs* (press release 528 dated Sept. 18).

resents a materialistic and atheistic creed, it inevitably is repugnant to those who believe in the supremacy of the spirit. Because it seeks world rule through the domination of all governments by the international Communist Party, it is repugnant to all who understand its purposes and, as patriots, cherish national independence. And because it employs fraud and violence to achieve its ends, it is repugnant to all who seek a world society of decency and order.

The United States, as the strongest nation of the non-Communist world, has had the major responsibility for meeting this challenge which, since 1950, has been able to exploit the resources of most of the Eurasian land mass and one-third of the world's population.

Since the death of Stalin in March 1953, there has been a Soviet disavowal of the ruthlessness of the Stalinist period. Internally, that disavowal has found some practical expression. Externally, Soviet policy has been marked by a more diversified range of political, diplomatic, and economic tactics vis-a-vis the non-Communist world. This became especially pronounced in 1955. There were such gestures as the sudden consent to a long-overdue Austrian treaty and the overtures to Yugoslavia. At the "summit" conference at Geneva there were professions of peaceful intent and an agreement to reunify Germany by free elections. There were profuse offers of "assistance" to many nations and a plea for "cultural relations."

But nowhere, except perhaps in Austria, did the Soviets yield anything of substance or enter into genuine negotiations on basic issues. Economic and military "assistance" was a Trojan horse whereby influence could be gained to promote political subversion. There was no honest acceptance of Yugoslavia's right to have a national Communist government not dominated by international communism. And in November 1955 at Geneva the Soviet Government flatly repudiated the July "summit" agreement for German reunification.

The year 1956 gave further evidence that the new rulers in Moscow were not essentially changed. Enticements were mingled with threats. When "de-Stalinization," proclaimed by the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, was interpreted in the satellites as justifying more freedom and independence, there were fierce reactions first at Poz-

nan, Poland, and then in Hungary. Obviously, those who presently dictate the doctrines of international communism are not in fact prepared to accept the consequences of their professed liberalization.

In all the 40 years of Bolshevik rule there is no episode more brutal than the Red Army suppression of the Hungarian people's 1956 uprising against intolerable oppression. And recent Soviet policies in the Near East are inexcusably mischievous.

That area, rich in cultural and religious tradition, yet stricken with historic dissensions and tragic poverty, was chosen in 1955 to be the scene of a new Communist hunt for power. Communist propaganda studiously sought to inflame animosities. The Soviet Government, drawing upon its semiobsolete war equipment, stimulated an arms race. As a direct or indirect result, violence and bitterness were increased and abject poverty was riveted more firmly as some governments mortgaged the future economic productivity of the people in order to buy Soviet arms. It has indeed been a cynical performance by those who profess to love peace and to desire to uplift the masses.

More than a decade of cold-war experience has confirmed our earlier judgments of international communism. It and the governments it controls are deeply hostile to us and to all free and independent governments. Its basic doctrine precludes its changing of its own accord. Self-advertised changes must be considered as mere stratagems.

We need not, however, despair. International communism is subject to change even against its will. It is not impervious to the erosion of time and circumstance. Khrushchev's speech of February 1956, the July 1957 breakup in the ruling clique at Moscow, and Mao's speech of February 27, 1957, indicate that, even in Russia and the China mainland, Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes are confronted with grave internal pressures and dilemmas. The yeast of change is at work, despite all the efforts of "democratic centralism" to keep matters moving in a strictly Leninist pattern. The rulers in Russia do not find it possible to combine industrial and military modernization with the personal repressions of the Middle Ages; and the rulers in China will not find it possible to fit the richly diversified culture of the Chinese into a Communist mold of conformity.

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The time may come, indeed we can be confident that it will come, when the nations now ruled by international communism will have governments which, whatever their label, in fact serve their own nations and their own peoples rather than the insatiable worldwide ambitions of an international party. There will be broadening participation in government. There will be increasing personal security under law. There will be a significant degree of freedom of thought and expression. And the workers will be permitted to have some choice of the work that they do and to enjoy more of the fruits of their labor. Under those conditions, the people, if not the masters of their government, will at least not be its abject slaves. Vast military power will no longer be completely at the disposal of those who accept no restraints either of a governmental or moral character and whose goal is worldwide rule. When that day comes, we can rejoice. Until that day comes, we shall need to remain on our guard.

III. Collective Security

During the last two decades, the United States has found it necessary to recast its ideas and policies regarding national security. The course of our thinking and planning has been in the direction of collective security. In our modern world no nation, however powerful, can find safety in isolation, and security for one is only to be achieved through cooperation with other like-minded nations.

The society of nations is undergoing the transformation that occurs whenever primitive societies develop. There is a gradual evolution from conditions where security is a matter of each for himself and the Devil take the hindmost, to a condition where security is a collective effort to which each contributes and from which each benefits. In that way there is greater security at less cost. The society of nations is gradually and painfully evolving from a primitive condition to one where security is a matter of collective effort and where defense is a common defense.

It is not easy to realize these principles in a world where people have long thought of sovereignty as a status unqualified by interdependence. Yet after a second generation of bitter experience, the United States, with many others, sees the indispensability of interdependence. Today we seek security through the strengthening of

universal institutions, by regional arrangements, by maintaining military capabilities in conjunction with our allies, and by determined efforts to diminish the risk of surprise attack and to limit and control armaments.

In 1945 the United States took the lead in organizing the United Nations. We hoped that it would become an effective instrument of collective security. But it still falls short of being that. United Nations action in a divided world has often been paralyzed. For example, the U.S.S.R. has exercised the veto in the Security Council about 80 times. No joint U.N. military force has been set up as contemplated in the charter, although Korea and Suez point to possible progress in this direction. Also, the Assembly, in the Suez and the Hungarian crises of last fall, displayed surprising determination and virtual unanimity.

It is sometimes said by way of reproach that in these matters the United Nations applied a "double standard"—severity toward Israel, France, and the United Kingdom, and leniency toward the Soviet Union. This charge has no basis in fact. The Assembly resolutions directed against the use of force in Egypt and in Hungary were equally peremptory.

The double standard was not in the United Nations but in the nations. There was the moral sensitivity of the Western nations, and their decent respect for the opinions of mankind. There was the immorality of Soviet communism, and its contempt for the opinions of mankind. We can rejoice that, among the nations, there are governments having standards higher than those of the Government of Soviet Russia. That is not a matter of reproach to them, or to the United Nations.

Despite hopeful indications of progress in the United Nations, the nations of the free world which felt endangered have, for the most part, felt it necessary to resort to collective, and usually regional, arrangements to safeguard their security. This has been in entire accord with the charter. In this development the United States has assumed a major role and responsibility. Since 1945 we have entered into collective security treaties with 42 other nations, and we have less formal arrangements with several more.

The first such treaty, the Rio Pact, was with our own neighbors of this hemisphere. We went on to broaden the base of collective security through a series of multilateral and bilateral pacts which now encompass much of the free world. The

forces of NATO, now including the Federal Republic of Germany, stand guard over the treaty-defined North Atlantic region, which includes the vital area of Western Europe. In the West Pacific and Far East, the SEATO and ANZUS pacts and four bilateral treaties establish the principle that a threat to one is the concern of all. In the Middle East, the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine assure collective response to Communist aggression at points of special danger or weakness. This nearly worldwide system of regional collective security has served all the participants well. It has deterred aggression and given much-needed assurance to peoples who are especially exposed to attack.

We must, in candor, admit that all of the participants do not look upon these arrangements alike. Some consider them broad political alliances, binding the parties, at least morally, to support each other generally. But the net result has been to further the application of the principle of collective security within the society of nations.

IV. The Strategy of Collective Self-Defense

Collective security must, of course, be buttressed by military capabilities to deter armed aggression and to cope with it if it should occur. In December 1950, in an address before the American Association for the United Nations, I spoke to this problem, pointing out that, "With more than 20 nations strung along the 20,000 miles of Iron Curtain, it is not possible to build up static defensive forces which could make each nation impregnable to such a major and unpredictable assault as Russia could launch. To attempt this would be to have strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere." I went on to say, "Against such military power as the Soviet Union can marshal, collective security depends on capacity to counterattack against the aggressor," and I pointed to our Strategic Air Force and our stock of weapons as constituting an arsenal of retaliation.

During the ensuing years the military strategy of the free-world allies has been largely based upon our great capacity to retaliate should the Soviet Union launch a war of aggression. It is widely accepted that this strategy of deterrence has, during this period, contributed decisively to the security of the free world.

However, the United States has not been content to rely upon a peace which could be preserved only by a capacity to destroy vast segments of the human race. Such a concept is acceptable only as a last alternative. In recent years there has been no other. But the resourcefulness of those who serve our nation in the field of science and weapon engineering now shows that it is possible to alter the character of nuclear weapons. It seems now that their use need not involve vast destruction and widespread harm to humanity. Recent tests point to the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and radiation effects of which can be confined substantially to predetermined targets.

In the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt. For example, terrain is often such that invasion routes can be decisively dominated by nuclear artillery. Thus, in contrast to the 1950 decade, it may be that by the 1960 decade the nations which are around the Sino-Soviet perimeter can possess an effective defense against full-scale conventional attack and thus confront any aggressor with the choice between failing or himself initiating nuclear war against the defending country. Thus the tables may be turned, in the sense that, instead of those who are nonaggressive having to rely upon all-out nuclear retaliatory power for their protection, would-be aggressors will be unable to count on a successful conventional aggression but must themselves weigh the consequences of invoking nuclear war.

It is precisely this evolution that Soviet diplomacy and propaganda strive most vigorously to prevent. They oppose all such experimental testing of nuclear devices as is necessary to find ways to reduce fallout and to reduce size. They seem to prefer that nuclear weapons be only the "horror" type of weapons. They apparently calculate that humanitarian instincts will prevent us from using such weapons. They know that, if Soviet conventional forces were operating in Europe, the megaton-type weapon with large fission fallout could not be used by Western forces without endangering the friendly peoples of the area. Under these conditions Sino-Soviet manpower and its conventional weapons would be-

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come the dominant military force in Eurasia. Such considerations make it important to combine the suspension of testing with other measures which will limit armament and the possibilities of surprise attack.

The Soviet Union, in its May 10, 1955, disarmament proposals, said:

There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation the security of the States signatory to the international convention can not be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving states.

The foregoing is certainly true, at least as regards the use of existing stocks of fissionable material. That is why we do not seek to control existing stocks. We accept their inevitability, limiting our control proposals to newly created fissionable material that can be controlled.

The Soviet statement continued:

Until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between States, any agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples. It will create a false sense of security, while in reality there will be a danger of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and hence the threat of surprise attack and the unleashing of an atomic war with all its appalling consequences for the people.

This, again, is a true statement. Unless there are effective measures to reduce "the threat of surprise attack," whether nuclear or otherwise, it would be imprudent to interrupt the safeguarded search for methods to apply nuclear power to weapons in a manner to enlarge the possibilities of defense greatly and at the same time greatly reduce the lethal fallout factor inherent in weapons which are still in a relatively early stage of development.

As nuclear weapons come to provide greater possibilities for defense, this will require changes in military and related political strategy. So long as collective security depends almost wholly upon the deterrent of retaliatory power and the ability to wreak great destruction upon an aggressor nation, there has to be almost sole dependence upon the United States. No other nation can afford the cost of maintaining adequate deterrent power. This requires a vast arsenal of planes, weapons,

and perhaps long-range missiles. These must be constantly renewed to overcome increasing defensive capabilities. This, in turn, requires vast outlay for experimentation.

However, as nuclear weapons become more tactical in character and thus more adaptable to area defense, there will inevitably be a desire on the part of those allies which are technically qualified to participate more directly in this defense and to have a greater assurance that this defensive power will in fact be used. Such factors are already leading to study of a so-called atomic weapons stockpile which could be established by the United States in the European NATO area and, as becomes appropriate, made available to NATO.

A concomitant of this problem is how to prevent the promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Without safeguards, such weapons might in the future get into the hands of irresponsible dictators and be used as a form of international blackmail. The world would indeed become an unhappy place to live in if humanity had to accept an ever-present threat of this character.

We are only beginning to envisage the drastic changes in political-military relations which will be consequent upon the rapid growth of scientific knowledge and operating experience in the nuclear field. New weapons possibilities are opening up in rapid succession. Political thinking finds it difficult to keep up with that pace. And, of course, there is inevitably some interval between the thinking and the institutionalizing of the results of thinking.

The development of a common defense has meant, and will continue to mean, heavy outlays for an effective and modern United States military establishment. It has also required, and will continue to require, the United States to give military assistance and support to the military forces of those nations associated with us in collective arrangements or in special need or danger. Such assistance is in no sense to be viewed as charity. It is based on a hardheaded appraisal of our own defense needs. Without it, our own defense costs would be far greater and our security far less. The aggregate military and economic resources of the free world coalition represent the greatest and least costly insurance against war.

V. "Disarmament"

The United States recognizes that armaments alone are no lasting guaranty of peace. We are, therefore, pursuing a policy designed to set up safeguards against surprise attack and to bring national armaments, both nuclear and conventional, under effective international limitation and supervision. It is true that so-called "disarmament" efforts in the past have proved futile. The Hague peace conferences, the Versailles treaty, the Washington Naval Limitation Agreement, the League of Nations disarmament conferences, are recent conspicuous examples of failure. But there are important differences today.

Past efforts have usually proceeded from the assumption that it is possible to establish and maintain certain defined levels of military strength and to equate these dependably as between the nations. Actually, military potentials are so imponderable that this always has been and always will be a futile pursuit. Today there is a new approach. It is proposed to establish a system of international supervision which will make massive surprise attack unlikely. If this happens, then general war becomes less likely and the level of armaments will almost automatically go down.

Today the great military establishments derive largely from one of two calculations. A potential attacker calculates that he may be able to accumulate the power to gain a decisive initial advantage by surprise attack. Those who feel that they may be attacked calculate that the only effective deterrent to attack is to possess, collectively, power so great and so decentralized that it cannot be rendered nugatory by a massive surprise attack.

New discoveries and their application lead to constantly mounting exertions to develop means of attack and of retaliation and of means of survival. The only effective way to stop the cycle is to establish such international supervision of the great sources of military power that it becomes unlikely that there can be undetected preparation for an attack massive enough to destroy the opposing source of power. That was President Eisenhower's "open skies" concept, first put forward at the Geneva "summit" conference of 1955.

A potential aggressor, subject to inspection from the air, supplemented by a ground component, will know that he probably cannot use vast armament to advantage. And nations exposed to ag-

gression will know that they probably cannot be wiped out at a single blow and that therefore they can rely more than now upon potential military strength rather than strength actually in being. Thus there will be no stimulation, as at present, for an arms race. This will not solve all the problems of armament, or guarantee peace. But the new approach could create an atmosphere in which other measures, now impossible, would become possible.

The most important difference from the past is, of course, the fact that never before has there been such need to reduce the risk of war. Today a general war between the great military powers could destroy almost all human life, certainly in the northern latitudes. Our working hypothesis must be that what is necessary is possible. We assume that the forces which man has created man can, by wisdom, resourcefulness, and discipline, harness and control. We persevere in common efforts to free the world from the continuing threat of destruction by the weapons that its civilization has produced.

VI. Free-World Health and Vitality

Nations, like individuals, cannot live to themselves alone. Realizing this, the American people have always given generously of their substance to victims of disaster in many parts of the world and have engaged in innumerable programs of humanitarian assistance. These, until recently, have been the outcome mainly of philanthropic motives. During the past decade they have reflected enlightened national self-interest.

We now see that the world has become so much a unit that, wherever the body politic is afflicted, the whole is endangered. We realize that peace and prosperity for one requires, in the long run, that all should have the opportunity to pursue happiness. We see the need for more vital domestic forces in all free lands, to resist Communist subversion or attack.

Since 1945 our nation has granted, outright, nearly \$50 billion in aid, military and economic. That has evidenced an enlightened conception of our own national interest. It is significant that, despite this assistance to others at the rate of about \$5 billion a year, our own economy has developed in a healthy manner. This has been a decade of rising prosperity. In 1946 our national income was approximately \$180 billion.

In 1951 it was approximately \$277 billion. In 1956 it was approximately \$344 billion.

The Marshall plan was the most dramatic of our economic assistance efforts. It provided Western Europe with some of the means, and with the time and opportunity, to save itself. Now we see in Western Europe the development of a degree of unity which had been the vision of enlightened statesmen for many years. There has been, first, the Coal and Steel Community, then the Brussels treaty for European union, and now the treaties for a common market and EURATOM. These developments are momentous in terms of developing unity, strength, and well-being in an area which for centuries has been the seat of recurrent wars threatening the very existence of Western civilization.

In recent years, as the Western European economy has been reestablished, the United States has placed increasing emphasis on economic and technical assistance to the newly awakened and needy peoples of Asia and Africa. As upwards of 800 million people, representing 20 new nations, have won political liberty, one of the momentous issues of our time has been whether this political liberty would also mean the liberation of the people from a quagmire of economic misery and hopelessness. If not, present political liberty may prove a mere transition from one form of colonial rule to another far worse.

All of our aid programs, whether military, economic, or technical, are rightly viewed as ventures in mutual security. If we have given more than others, this reflects our greater ability to give. An important question now raised about our mutual security policies is, will there be an early end to them? Recent studies by expert commissions all attest to their continuing necessity.

The time to end such assistance will be when it no longer serves the enlightened self-interest of the United States. Military assistance and defense support represent about 70 percent of the entire program. That is part of our own defense. As regards economic assistance, we can expect private capital gradually to assume increasing responsibility for promoting the development of less well-developed areas, provided there is political stability. It is to be noted that, while the dollar value of our mutual security spending has not greatly declined in recent years,

an increasing amount of this is in terms of loans rather than of grants. Also, the total of public loans and grants now represents only about 1 percent of our national income, whereas a few years ago grants alone represented about 3 percent.

A cessation of our mutual security programs would, under present conditions, be disastrous. What is needed is to put necessary aid programs on a more long-term, businesslike basis, reducing grant aid to a minimum and applying our assistance in ways that will best help needy peoples to help themselves. As a result of intensive studies independently initiated by the Executive and the Congress, one new instrumentality is now being inaugurated, the Development Loan Fund. This, when adequately capitalized, will place major responsibility on the receiving countries and stimulate self-help and private investment.

United States foreign economic policy has been vigorous in fields other than aid. President Eisenhower's speech to the United Nations in December 1953 dramatized the possible peaceful uses of atomic energy. Much has been accomplished to realize these possibilities through bilateral agreements. Recently the United States ratified the statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency, which should be a milestone in the general application of this marvelous new resource for the benefit and not for the destruction of mankind.

We recognize that governmental restrictions on trade have in the past throttled world commerce to the detriment of every nation. We have entered into international undertakings, notably the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to prevent this and to promote the interchange of goods and services. This expansion materially benefits the United States and friendly nations. Measures which might adversely affect a nation are avoided. Economic growth is stimulated throughout the world. The benefits of advances in one country are readily diffused to others.

We do not forget that every government has a primary duty to serve its own people. But usually that service can be best rendered by finding ways which help others also, or which at least do not hurt others. Occasionally, and happily only rarely, situations arise which cannot be resolved by this formula. But in general we seek an international society in which men, goods,

and ideas flow freely and without obstruction throughout a wide area and in which the opportunity to pursue happiness is open to every man and woman. The United States market, which dependably offers so much that others want and which dependably buys so much that others would sell, is the great economic stabilizer of the free world. It helps to combat communism and the self-centered nationalisms which are alike in rejecting the concept of interdependence.

Few economic theories are today as obsolete as those of Marx. They were propagated nearly a century ago in relation to a society which since then has rapidly transformed itself through the force of its own dynamic qualities.

The social and economic basis of democracy has been widened throughout the Western World, and the same process is beginning and accelerating in other free-world areas. International communism is a reactionary movement. Its "planning" makes slaves of the producers and creates a new exploiting and ruling class. It is replete with contradictions which, in free countries, have been resolved by a peaceful, yet dynamic, evolution.

We cannot, of course, claim perfection. The dramatic and peaceful development of the social and economic structure of our free societies must and will go forward. But even though we do not claim perfection, we can claim that the social goals which communism pretends to seek are in fact achieved to a far greater extent within our free society than they are achieved in Soviet Russia or Communist China.

VII. Peaceful Change

As our country has been swept more fully into the broad currents of human affairs, we have been made more and more conscious of those rapid world movements of our century which seem incessantly to transform the international landscape. Change is the law of life, and that includes international life. Our common problem, in a world of rapid and often momentous change, is to insure that necessary changes occur in peaceful fashion without upheaval or war. Violent change is never selective change. It destroys the good as well as the bad. Change is beneficent when it is selective, continuing and developing the good while shedding that which is evil, outmoded, or inadequate.

We have already alluded to some of the areas where change is most conspicuous. There is first

of all the change which will inevitably result from the splitting of the atom. A vast new source of power is available to man, and we can be sure that it will be used to effect momentous changes. It can destroy man, or it can enrich him. The choice is up to man himself. The United States first had the power of fission and used it in war to defend freedom. We feel a special responsibility to help to assure that man's momentous choice shall be "atoms for peace."

Another vast force for change is political nationalism. This is operating strongly in Asia and Africa. Since 1945 it has resulted in the creation of a score of new nations. Other peoples are well on their way to political independence.

But the mere act of granting political independence does not of itself assure that the newly independent peoples will in fact have governments of their own choosing or governments able and willing to serve the governed. It does not of itself mean that the society of nations is enriched by new recruits dedicated to principles of interdependence and an international order of law and justice. It is going to be necessary to find policies to cope with new demands of colonial peoples, with strident and embittered nationalisms, and with social unrest among those who tend to feel that political liberty automatically should provide them with new economic opportunity.

The United States, once itself a colony, shares and sympathizes with the aspirations of peoples for political independence. Also, we know the extent to which liberty, for its own self-preservation, requires the self-restraint of moral law and the education to make sound judgments. We can and should play an important part in finding the policies to cope with the political and social ferment of much of the human race.

We recognize, as does the United Nations Charter in article 14, that there will be constantly arising particular situations likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations and calling for peaceful adjustment. We have noted in recent years the emergence of such situations, for example, the disputes over Cyprus, Kashmir, and West Irian; between Arabs and Israelis; and over Suez. These not only disrupt world peace and comity. They provide fertile soil for Communist propaganda and penetration.

The United States recognizes that, in the case of such disputes, all of the merits are not on one

side. Therefore we do not identify ourselves with any purely partisan approach. The Soviet rulers, unconcerned with the merits and eager only to extend their power, are prepared to back one side against the other if, in return, they obtain political advantages. Because they sometimes gain advantages out of such disputes, their interest lies in creating and exacerbating disputes and preventing their settlement.

This illustrates how important it is for the free world to establish regular procedures for the settlement of disputes between its members. This has already been done in the Western Hemisphere through the Organization of American States. Within the past few years several serious disputes between American states have been successfully dealt with by the procedures of this organization. Its members deserve the highest praise for their loyalty to the peaceful processes of law and justice which they have established. They have set a notable example which ought to be followed more generally.

Largely as a result of United States initiation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now developing processes for the settlement of disputes between its members. Last year the Secretary-General of NATO was given new responsibilities in this respect.

There are, in the long run, great potentialities in article 14 of the United Nations Charter, which authorizes the Assembly to recommend change in the status quo. The exercise of this delicate function requires knowledge, wisdom, and self-restraint. It becomes particularly difficult for the Assembly to exercise this function when a powerful minority of members seeks not fair and just settlements but unsettlements which lend themselves to the use by international communism of its revolutionary tactics.

Sometimes it is felt that the United States ought more often to use its power to effectuate settlements. The United States can and does exert an influence in quiet and inconspicuous ways as a friend of all the parties. We stand ready to exercise our good offices if and when invited to do so under adequate terms of reference. But we do not assume the right to meddle or be the arbiter of other peoples' affairs.

The most dangerous of all unresolved disputes are those within the areas now under the rule of international communism. The pattern here is

classic. There is the inevitability of change, but the situation is dominated by those who do not believe in peaceful change at the expense of their power. Such a state of affairs has historically produced violent eruptions. Some of the areas in question are especially explosive as they involve the artificial division of historic nations—Germany, Korea, and Viet-Nam. Others, as lately demonstrated in Hungary and Poland, contain resentments so bitter that many patriots would die in revolt against hopeless odds rather than continue to suffer in silence.

United States policy, as proclaimed repeatedly, will never sanction these injustices nor accept them as permanent. But we strive only by peaceful means to achieve justice. It would not be in the general interest, nor in the interest of the peoples directly concerned, for events to shape up into war. We shall continue to employ all the resources of the United Nations and all diplomatic means and moral pressures to alleviate the injustices and oppressions suffered by these peoples and to make their plight known to world opinion. We have faith in their ultimate freedom and independence. When the Russian leaders decide to serve the interests of Russia and cease to be the agents of international communism, they will act in the knowledge that Russia's long-term interests require the reunification of Germany in freedom and the liberation of the satellites. Only thus can Russia achieve its proper desire to be surrounded by friendly peoples. The martyrs of Hungary have not died in vain if they have advanced the coming of that day.

Even such a brief survey of the forces working for change cannot but leave us with a sense of their immensity and the relative paucity of political means for keeping them within peaceful channels. Peace and justice are surely in jeopardy.

Within a stable individual society there are institutions to effectuate and legalize change—usually parliamentary bodies which make and remake laws so that political, economic, and social changes occur peacefully and with legitimacy. In the international field concepts of sovereignty which have become obsolete lead nations to feel that they can put what they deem to be their own national rights and interests above the need of the whole society of nations—the need for peaceful settlement. It will probably be a long time before there is any universal mandatory process for

effectuating international change. But there can and should be a far greater willingness than there now is to subordinate national interests to the interest of the world community, to use existing agencies such as the Court of International Justice, and to develop and accept a body of written or unwritten international law.

VIII. Conclusion

Two significant facts stand out respecting United States foreign policy. The first is that our policies have developed as a reflection of deeply ingrained national characteristics. The second is that our policies have been influenced and modified by changing world conditions in the effort to apply our basic concepts to actual conditions and to the challenges they have presented.

These two features of our policy are by no means incompatible. To hold to national judgments of right and wrong does not mean that we are so closely wedded to doctrinaire concepts that we cannot adjust our policies to the demands of the hour. To think of our policies as shifting and changing in order to cope with varying situations need not be to infer that no central and governing core of principle gives them continuity.

In this article we have dwelt mainly on the manner in which policy has adapted itself to new and challenging problems; but the manner and conduct have been guided throughout by certain principles.

These principles were unforgettably formulated by George Washington in his Farewell Address. He there points out that "of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports." And he went on to emphasize the primary importance of a general diffusion of knowledge. "In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened."

Because of our religious beliefs we attach exceptional importance to freedom. We believe in the sanctity of the human personality, in the inalienable rights with which men are endowed by their Creator, and in their right to have governments of their own choosing. But we also believe that individuals as well as governments are subject to moral law. We recognize that liberty, whether it be individual or national, can be dangerous license

unless it is exercised under the disciplines of moral law and with adequate knowledge and education to assure that moral judgments in fact take all relevant factors into account.

We are as a nation unsympathetic to systems and governments that deny human freedom and seek to mold all men to a preconceived pattern and to use them as tools to aggrandize the state. We are also unsympathetic to assertions of sovereignty which do not accept the concept of social interdependence. As Americans we have built our nation on the federal principle, drawing together what were sovereign states into a cooperative community. We thus naturally invoke the idea of cooperation between nations in the pursuit of ends which correspond with the aspirations of all people.

Despite a certain superficial indifference to the niceties of law observance, Americans have developed a profound respect for law as the basis of social and civic life. We conceive of manmade law as an effort to apply the moral law to the conditions of time and place. Our Constitution is the oldest basic written law in the world today. This concept of law permeates our entire political system and gives it a stability and moderation rarely matched among contemporary governments. We yearn to see the behavior of nations in their relations with one another rest upon the foundation of agreed legal principles derived from moral concepts. We abhor arbitrary government which reflects only the caprice of a tyrant.

These concepts, taken together, constitute our American way of life. They represent, for us, the idea and reality of freedom under law—of which the most authoritative is moral law. It is inevitable that they should influence our foreign policy. For, under a representative form of government, foreign policy is valid only as an expression and a projection of national character and national convictions. Whoever would understand our policy should try to comprehend us as a nation.

The constancy of our national character is what, even in such a swiftly changing era, gives stability and continuity to our foreign policy. It is well that this is so, for it enables those who understand the United States to comprehend also the mainsprings of its action and thus estimate, in their own interest, what the response of the United States to any situation is likely to be.

The fact has an important bearing on our alliances. As leader of a great coalition, we can never hope to please all countries. But we can win respect if it is felt that we are acting in true character.

It is important also in relation to those who are hostile to us. Potential enemies will be less inclined to gamble on our behavior—with all the risks of miscalculation—if they can count with a reasonable degree of certainty upon our national conduct.

So toward all, whether friendly or not, we should act as a people proud of our heritage, assured in our convictions, and confident in our destiny. We have no desire to impose upon others the pattern of our thought and our institutions. Yet we may take pride in the fact that our principles are drawn from the great thinkers of the 18th-century “age of enlightenment” who impressed their ideas deeply upon modern Western culture as a whole. These principles are not narrowly parochial but universal in their application. In America they were the inspiration of the greatest democratic experiment in history. Insofar as our national behavior reflects these principles, it is certain to meet, in the long run, with understanding and respect.

U.S. To Waive Fingerprinting of Winter Olympics Participants

Press release 527 dated September 17

The following letter was sent on September 12 to Prentiss C. Hale, president of the 1960 Squaw Valley VIII Olympic Winter Games Organizing Committee, at San Francisco.

DEAR MR. HALE: With respect to those Olympic officials and athletes who are certified by the various national Olympic associations and committees as qualified to participate in the 1960 Squaw Valley Winter Olympic Games, you may inform the International Olympic Committee that the United States Government will not discriminate between or among them regardless of their country or place of origin.

You are aware, of course, that there are non-discriminatory laws and regulations affecting entry into the United States which would be applicable to all members of the Olympic teams and all Olympic officials coming to Squaw Valley irre-

spective of their country or place of origin. These include requirements of health and security.

In the past, there was a fingerprinting requirement which was mandatory for all alien visitors save, in the discretion of the Secretary of State, for certain diplomats and Government officials. This law has recently been amended to permit the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to waive this requirement. A copy of the amendment is attached for your information. The Department is advised that qualified Olympic officials and athletes coming to the United States solely for the purpose of participating in the Winter Olympics as such Olympic officials and athletes, would qualify as nonimmigrant aliens with respect to whom such a waiver could be given upon compliance with the provisions of the attached amendment.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Enclosure

CERTAIN REVISIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS

SEC. 8. The Secretary of State and the Attorney General are hereby authorized, in their discretion and on a basis of reciprocity, pursuant to such regulations as they may severally prescribe, to waive the requirement of fingerprinting specified in sections 221 (b) and 262 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, respectively, in the case of any nonimmigrant alien.

Air Transport Consultations With Brazil

Press release 531 dated September 19

Delegations of the Governments of the United States and Brazil began consultations in Washington on September 19 under the terms of the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1946 between the United States and Brazil. The last formal meeting between delegations of the two countries on aviation matters was held in October 1950. The current discussions will be largely devoted to an examination of operations by the airlines of both countries under the terms of the 1946 agreement.

The chairman of the Brazilian delegation is Maj. Brig. Alvaro Hecksher, chairman of the Brazilian aviation policy-forming organization

CERNAI. Other members of the Brazilian delegation are Federico Duarte de Oliveira, chief of the Civil Air Section, Cabinet of the Minister of Aeronautics; Roberto Pimentel, director of the Traffic Division, Directorate of Civil Aeronautics; Lt. Col. José Carlos de Miranda Correa, assistant to the director of air routes; L. de Berenguer Cesar, in charge of transportation affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the above-mentioned are members of CERNAI); Luiz Paulo Lindenbergs Sette, Third Secretary, Brazilian Embassy, Washington; Capt. Pedro Lamego, aide-de-camp to Major Brigadier Hecksher; and Nestor Jost and Augusto de Gregorio, Members of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.

The United States delegation is headed by Henry T. Snowdon, chief, Aviation Division, Department of State. Other members of the delegation are Louis J. Hector, Member, Civil Aeronautics Board; Bradley D. Nash, Deputy Under Secretary for Transportation, Department of Commerce; Joseph C. Watson, chief, International Division, Civil Aeronautics Board; Gerald W. Russell, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs, Department of State; John J. Ingersoll, Office of South American Affairs, Department of State; Stanley Grand, Department of State; James C. Haahr, Aviation Division, Department of State; Dorothy Thomas, International Division, Civil Aeronautics Board.

The following will attend as observers: Oren Harris, chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, and Charles A. Wolverton, ranking minority member, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives. Representatives of the Air Transport Association of America will also attend.

NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Program for 1958-59

Press release 532 dated September 20

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has announced the availability of a number of fellowships and scholarships for the academic year 1958-59. This is the third year of the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Program, which provides opportunities for study or research by nationals

of states which are members of the organization. The fellowships are intended for scholars with established reputations, while the scholarships will be awarded to students who have graduated from college in recent years. The aim of the program, according to the announcement made by the NATO headquarters in Paris, is "to promote study and research (preferably leading to publication) on various aspects of the common interests, traditions, and outlook of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, in order to throw light on the history, present status, and future development of the concept of the Atlantic Community, and of the problems which confront it."

The awards will normally be for a period of 2 to 4 months for fellows and a full academic year for scholars. In addition to a financial grant, transportation to and from the place where the study or research is to be undertaken will be provided. Grantees will be required to submit to NATO a substantial report together with a brief summary, in English or French, on the results of their work.

The competition for U.S. citizens opened on September 15, and applications must be submitted to the appropriate agency prior to November 1, 1957. Candidates for fellowships should apply to the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Ave. NW, Washington 25, D. C. Applications for scholarships should be submitted to the Institute of International Education, 1 East 67th St., New York 21, N. Y. The Board of Foreign Scholarships, appointed by the President to advise on policies relating to certain aspects of the International Educational Exchange Program, will nominate panels of candidates based on the recommendations of the two cooperating agencies, which the Department of State will present to NATO's Selection Committee. Announcement of the awards will be made on April 4, 1958, the ninth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Emphasizing the multilateral character of the program, the plan for selection gives preference, when other qualifications are equal, to candidates prepared to conduct their projects on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. The Selection Committee will aim at an equitable geographic distribution of awards but will not be bound by a strict rule.

Germany Expands Restitution Claims Coverage

Press release 525 dated September 16

The American Embassy at Bonn has reported that recent modifications of the German Federal Restitution Law open the way for the filing of certain categories of monetary restitution claims by former Nazi persecutees who have been unable to obtain compensation under previous legislation. The modifications relate to claims arising from unlawful taking by certain German entities of tangible or intangible property which at the time of the taking was "identifiable" within the meaning of restitution legislation but which cannot be restituted because of loss, damage, or deterioration. The modifications are believed of particular interest to individuals who sustained losses due to confiscation of identifiable property outside West Germany which property was subsequently sent into West Germany or Berlin. The development is considered of significance in cases where special levies or discriminatory taxes were collected through seizure of such property. Knowledge of the final location of the property is not required.

Claims must be filed with German authorities not later than April 1, 1958.¹

Renegotiation of Tariff Concessions Proposed by Five Countries

Press release 524 dated September 16

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Committee for Reciprocity Information is requesting submission of views in connection with United States participation in tariff negotiations arising from the desire of Austria, Canada, Ceylon, Greece, and the Union of South Africa to modify or withdraw certain tariff concessions in their respective schedules annexed to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). There is attached a list of items of interest to the United States which the countries indicated desire to

¹The Department of State has available an information sheet giving further details of the German legislation which will be furnished upon request.

withdraw from the schedules of GATT concessions or to modify in these negotiations.

The countries listed are among those which have expressed a desire to avail themselves of the opportunity on January 1, 1958, to modify or withdraw concessions in their schedules to the general agreement. Under procedures established by the contracting parties to the agreement, the country proposing to modify or withdraw a concession negotiates, with respect to compensation with the country with which the concession was originally negotiated and with any other country having a principal supplying interest. In these negotiations new concessions may be granted by the country proposing the modification or withdrawal. Another possible result may be withdrawal or upward adjustment, by the countries adversely affected, of concessions of a value substantially equivalent to the concession modified or withdrawn. In addition to these negotiations, the country proposing modification or withdrawal of concessions consults with other countries substantially interested in the concessions.

The Committee for Reciprocity Information is an interagency group which receives views of interested persons regarding proposed or existing trade agreements. The committee consists of a member of the U.S. Tariff Commission and representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury, and the International Cooperation Administration.

In preparation for the proposed negotiations the Committee for Reciprocity Information would welcome views from interested parties with regard to the possible effect on United States trade of modification or withdrawal of the concessions on the items in the attached list. In addition, the committee invites the submission of views regarding concessions which the United States might seek from the respective countries as compensation as well as views concerning possible upward adjustment in United States rates of duty on commodities which are now the subject of concessions in the general agreement.

Views on the foregoing matters should be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information by the close of business on October 7, 1957. All communications, in 15 copies, should be addressed to: The Secretary of the Committee

for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D. C.

If any interested party considers that his views cannot be adequately expressed to the committee in a written brief, he should make this known to the secretary of the committee, who will then arrange for oral presentation before the committee.

LIST OF ITEMS

GATT Concessions Proposed for Modification or Withdrawal by Austria, Canada, Ceylon, Greece, and Union of South Africa in Which the United States Has an Interest

Austria

White oils
Transformer oils

Linoleum
Inlaid linoleum
Boiler feeder pumps and domestic pumps of iron, under 1,000 kilograms

Combustion engines weighing less than 25 kilograms each
Refrigerating machinery of iron, less than 1,000 kilograms each

Aromatic essences not containing alcohol or ether

Canada

Primary iron and steel products, approximately 60 trade classifications in the following categories:

blooms
cogs
ingots
rounds
squares
sheets
plates
bars
hoop
band
band strip
structural steel

pipes, tubes, pipe fittings and couplings, including casings for use in casing water, natural gas, or oil wells, and pressure pipe for pipe lines, as well as pipe and valves used in drilling for water, natural gas, or oil, or in prospecting for minerals

Ceylon

Razor blades
Cotton towels

Greece

Goat and sheepskin leather
Whisky

Union of South Africa

Canned asparagus

Parts and material for use in the assembly of motor cars in the Union of South Africa (excludes radio apparatus and certain other specified parts and material)

Radio and wireless apparatus (excludes radio-phonograph combinations and apparatus imported for ships, aircraft, or use in public radio service)

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

85th Congress, 1st Session

Emergency Oil Lift Program and Related Oil Problems. Joint hearings before subcommittees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs pursuant to S. Res. 57. Part 3, appendix A, 654 pp.; part 4, appendix B, 591 pp.

Building a World of Free Peoples. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Volume I, March 1-April 9, 1957. 103 pp.

Department of State Passport Policies. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. April 2 and 11, 1957. 137 pp.

Food Stockpiling Within the United States and Abroad for Future Emergencies. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Consumers Study of the House Committee on Agriculture on H.R. 534. Part 3, June 12 and 13, 1957. 115 pp.

Foreign Trade Interests in the State of Michigan. Prepared at the request of Members of the Michigan Congressional Delegation by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. H. Doc. 209, July 16, 1957. 179 pp.

22d Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. S. Doc. 47, July 31, 1957. 257 pp.

Inter-American Highway and Miscellaneous Roads on Public Lands. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Works on S. 2157, a bill to authorize appropriation of an additional sum required for completion of the Inter-American Highway, and miscellaneous roads on public lands. August 6 and 7, 1957. 53 pp.

Double Taxation Convention With Pakistan. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on income tax convention with Pakistan (Exec. N, 85th Cong., 1st sess.). August 9, 1957. 66 pp.

A Collection of Excerpts and a Bibliography relative to United States foreign aid prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. S. Doc. 62, August 12, 1957. 39 pp.

Mutual Security Appropriation Bill, 1958. Report to accompany H.R. 9302. H. Rept. 1172, August 15, 1957. 15 pp.

The International Patent System and Foreign Policy. Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary pursuant to S. Res. 55. Study No. 5. S. Doc. 63, August 22, 1957. 52 pp.

18th Semiannual Report on Educational Exchange Activities, January 1-June 30, 1957, transmitted by the Chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, pursuant to Public Law 402, 80th Congress. H. Doc. 236, August 27, 1957. 8 pp.

Antidumping Act, 1921. Report to accompany H.R. 6006. H. Rept. 1261, August 27, 1957. 20 pp.

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services covering period from December 1, 1955, through November 30, 1956. S. Rept. 1162, August 29, 1957. 26 pp.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Report of the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to the provisions of S. Res. 93, S. Res. 185, and S. Res. 286, 84th Congress, and extended by S. Res. 61, S. Res. 151, and S. Res. 192, 85th Congress. S. Rept. 1167, September 6, 1957. 23 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During September 1957

U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee on Disarmament	London	Mar. 18-Sept. 6
ILO "Art and Labor" Exposition	Geneva	June 15-Sept. 22
18th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art; and 7th International Exhibition of the Documentary and Short Film	Venice	Aug. 12-Sept. 8
Organization of American States: Economic Conference	Buenos Aires	Aug. 15-Sept. 4
11th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 18-Sept. 8
International Scientific Radio Union: 12th General Assembly	Boulder, Colo	Aug. 22-Sept. 4
ICAO Teletypewriter Technical Panel: 2d Meeting	Montreal	Aug. 26-Sept. 6
7th British Commonwealth Forestry Conference	Australia and New Zealand	Aug. 26-Sept. 26
9th International Congress on Cell Biology	St. Andrews, Scotland	Aug. 28-Sept. 3
International Geographical Union: Regional Conference	Nara and Kyoto	Aug. 29-Sept. 3
International Union of Public Transportation: 33d Congress	Hamburg and Berlin	Aug. 29-Sept. 6
9th Pan American Railway Congress	Buenos Aires	Aug. 30-Sept. 13
International Exposition of the Sea	Marseille	Sept. 1-30
U.N. ECAFE Workshop on Problems of Budget Reclassification: 2d Meeting	Bangkok	Sept. 3-10
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics: 11th General Assembly	Toronto	Sept. 3-14
UNICEF Executive Board	New York	Sept. 3-14
WHO Regional Committee for Western Pacific: 8th Session	Hong Kong	Sept. 5-11
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Experts on Track Cost	Geneva	Sept. 9-11
FAO/ECE Timber Committee: 2d Session of Committee on Forest Working Techniques and Training of Forest Workers	Moscow	Sept. 9-14
UNESCO International Conference on Radioisotopes	Paris	Sept. 9-20
ICAO Legal Committee: Special Subcommittee on Rule 57 of Standing Rules of Procedure	Tokyo	Sept. 10-11
U.N. General Assembly: 11th Session (reconvened)	New York	Sept. 10-14
PASO Executive Committee: 32d and 33d Meetings	Washington	Sept. 10-27
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on International Traffic Arteries	Geneva	Sept. 12-13
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 46th Conference	London	Sept. 12-18
ICAO Legal Committee: 11th Session	Tokyo	Sept. 12-25
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 7th Special Session	New York	Sept. 12-20
IA-ECSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports and Harbors	Montevideo	Sept. 16-19
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Executive Committee	Ibadan, Nigeria	Sept. 16-26
PASO Directing Council: 10th Meeting	Washington	Sept. 16-27
U.N. ECAFE/FAO Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 3d Meeting	Bangkok	Sept. 16-28
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	Sept. 16 (1 day)
International Union of Pure and Applied Physics: 9th General Assembly	Rome	Sept. 17-20
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Subcommittee on Road Transport	Geneva	Sept. 17-20
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 2d Meeting	Ibadan, Nigeria	Sept. 17-26
GATT Intercessional Committee of Contracting Parties	Geneva	Sept. 19-27
U.N. ECE Ad Hoc Working Party on Gas Problems	Geneva	Sept. 23-27
FAO International Rice Commission: 7th Meeting of Working Party on Rice Breeding	Vercelli, Italy	Sept. 23-28
FAO International Rice Commission: 6th Meeting of Working Party on Fertilizers	Vercelli, Italy	Sept. 23-28
FAO International Rice Commission: Ad Hoc Working Group on Soil-Water-Plant Relationships	Vercelli, Italy	Sept. 23-28

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Sept. 13, 1957. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; ILO, International Labor Organization; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; IA-ECSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Adjourned During September 1957—Continued

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Monetary Fund: 12th Annual Meeting of Boards of Governors.	Washington	Sept. 23-28
17th International Conference of Sociology	Beirut	Sept. 23-29
IA-ECSOC: Meeting of Experts on Technical Standards	Rio de Janeiro	Sept. 23-30*

In Session as of September 30, 1957

Universal Postal Union: 14th Congress	Ottawa	Aug. 14-
9th Pan American Railway Congress	Buenos Aires	Aug. 30-
International Atomic Energy Agency Preparatory Commission (PRECO).	Vienna	Sept. 9-
ICAO Communications Division: 6th Session	Montreal	Sept. 10-
U.N. General Assembly: 12th Session	New York	Sept. 17-
4th FAO/WHO Conference on Nutrition Problems in Latin America.	Guatemala City	Sept. 23-
WMO Executive Committee: 9th Session	Geneva	Sept. 24-
ICEM Executive Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	Sept. 26-
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law	Brussels	Sept. 30-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 45th Meeting.	Bergen, Norway	Sept. 30-
GATT Balance-of-Payments Consultations: Working Party	Geneva	Sept. 30-
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Experts on Technical Questions (Rail).	Geneva	Sept. 30-

Scheduled October 1-December 31, 1957

International Atomic Energy Agency: 1st General Conference and 1st Meeting of Board of Governors.	Vienna	Oct. 1-
GATT Article XXVIII Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Oct. 1-
ILO Meeting of Experts on Fires and Electricity in Coal Mines	Geneva	Oct. 2-
IA-ECSOC: Inter-American Seminar on Rural Electrification Cooperatives.	Recife City, Brazil	Oct. 5-
ICAO Preparatory Meeting on Air Traffic Control Problems in the European-Mediterranean Region.	Lisbon	Oct. 7-
FAO International Fishing Gear Congress	Hamburg	Oct. 7-
ILO Iron and Steel Committee: 6th Session	Monterrey	Oct. 7-
ICEM Council: 7th Session	Geneva	Oct. 7-
GATT Balance-of-Payment Consultations	Geneva	Oct. 7-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee (and Related Meetings)	Geneva	Oct. 7-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 2d Session	Washington	Oct. 7-
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 9th Meeting.	Saigon	Oct. 7-
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Officials Meeting.	Saigon	Oct. 7-
8th U.N. Technical Assistance Conference	New York	Oct. 10-
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 1st Session of Working Group on Telecommunications.	Paris	Oct. 14*
U.N. ECE/FAO Timber Committee: 15th Session	Geneva	Oct. 14-
U.N. ECAFE Highway Subcommittee: 4th Session	Bangkok	Oct. 14-
GATT Intersessional Committee	Geneva	Oct. 16-
FAO Study Group on Grains: 2d Meeting	Rome	Oct. 17-
GATT Contracting Parties: 12th Session	Geneva	Oct. 17-
South Pacific Commission: 17th Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Oct. 18-
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Ministerial Meeting.	Saigon	Oct. 21-
ILO Governing Body: 137th Session (and Committees)	Geneva	Oct. 21-
U.N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade and East-West Trade Consultations.	Geneva	Oct. 21-
UNESCO Meeting of Governmental Experts on Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials.	Geneva	Oct. 21-
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 1st Meeting	Montreal	Oct. 22-
2d ICAO South American/South Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting.	São Paulo	Oct. 22-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 29th Session	Rome	Oct. 24-
FAO Committee on Relations With International Organizations	Rome	Oct. 24-
19th International Red Cross Conference	New Delhi	Oct. 24-

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled October 1–December 31, 1957—Continued

U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 4th Session of Inland Waterways Subcommittee.	Jogjakarta	Oct. 24-
SEATO: Committee of Economic Experts	Bangkok	Oct. 28-
GATT Ministerial Meeting	Geneva	Oct. 28-
International Wheat Council: 23d Session	London	Oct. 30-
FAO Council: 27th Session	Rome	Oct. 31-
U.N. Advisory Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: 7th Session.	New York	Nov. 1-
International Union of Official Travel Organizations: Executive Committee.	Washington	Nov. 1-
FAO Conference: 9th Session	Rome	Nov. 2-
International Union of Travel Organizations: 12th General Assembly.	Washington	Nov. 3-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 5th Meeting	Vancouver	Nov. 4-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 3d Meeting.	Calcutta	Nov. 4-
WMO Commission for Bibliography and Publications: 2d Session	Paris	Nov. 5-
Caribbean Commission: 7th Session of West Indian Conference	Curaçao	Nov. 11-
ILO Asian Advisory Committee: 8th Session	New Delhi	Nov. 11-
U.N. ECAFE Industry and Trade Committee: 3d Session of Subcommittee on Minerals Resources.	Calcutta	Nov. 11-
ICAO Radiotelephony Speech Panel: 1st Meeting	Montreal	Nov. 12-
4th ILO Asian Regional Conference	New Delhi	Nov. 13-
Pan Pacific Surgical Association: 7th Congress	Honolulu	Nov. 13-
Inter-American Statistical Institute: 5th Session of Committee on Improvement of National Statistics (COINS).	Washington	Nov. 14-
9th Pacific Science Congress	Bangkok	Nov. 18-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 15th Session (and Working Parties).	Geneva	Nov. 18-
UNESCO Executive Board: 49th Session	Paris	Nov. 18-
FAO Study Group on Coconut and Coconut Products	Rome	Nov. 22-
FAO Council: 28th Session	Rome	Nov. 23-
Caribbean Commission: 25th Meeting	Curaçao	Nov. 25-
Customs Cooperation Council: 11th Session	Brussels	Nov. 25-
ILO Tripartite Meeting on Mines Other Than Coal Mines	Geneva	Nov. 25-
ILO Meeting of Experts on Radiation Protection	Geneva	Nov. 25-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee and Working Parties	Geneva	Nov. 25-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 5th Session of Railway Subcommittee.	Bangkok	Nov. 25-
International Sugar Council: Statistical Committee	London	Nov. 25-
International Sugar Council: Executive Committee	London	Nov. 26-
International Sugar Council: 14th Session	London	Nov. 28-
FAO/ECE Working Party on Forestry Statistics	Geneva	Dec. 2-
FAO Plant Protection Committee for Southeast Asia and Pacific Region: 2d Meeting.	Ceylon	Dec. 2-
WMO Regional Association III (South America): 2d Session	Caracas	Dec. 4-
3d U.N. ECAFE Regional Technical Conference on Water Resources Development.	Manila	Dec. 4-
ILO Committee of Experts on Social Policy in Nonmetropolitan Territories: 6th Session.	Geneva	Dec. 9-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 1st Session	Bangkok	Dec. 11-
U.N. ECE Agricultural Problems Committee: 9th Meeting	Geneva	Dec. 16*

Reports on Hague Conference on Private International Law

Several articles have been or soon will be published by members of the United States observer delegation relating to their attendance at the Eighth Session of The Hague Conference on Private International Law, which was held at The Hague, the Netherlands, from October 3 to 24, 1956. Although the United States is not a member of the Conference, the U.S. Government was

invited by the Netherlands Government to be represented at the Conference. In response to this invitation the U.S. Government, after consultation with a number of associations and organizations in the United States interested in the work of the Conference in the field of private international law, designated an official observer delegation made up of the following four persons:

Philip W. Amram, Washington, D.C.

Joe C. Barrett, Jonesboro, Ark.
Kurt H. Nadelmann, Cambridge, Mass.
Willis L. M. Reese, New York, N.Y.

Reports of the members of the observer delegation have been published as follows:

Kurt H. Nadelmann and Willis L. M. Reese, "The Eighth Session of The Hague Conference on Private International Law," 12 The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 51 (1957);

Willis L. M. Reese, "Some Observations on the Eighth Session of The Hague Conference on Private International Law," 5 American Journal of Comparative Law 611 (1956);

Kurt H. Nadelmann, "The United States at The Hague Conference on Private International Law," 51 American Journal of International Law 618 (1957);

Philip W. Amram, "A Unique Organization: The Conference on Private International Law," 43 American Bar Association Journal 809 (1957).

A report by Joe C. Barrett will be in the Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for the year 1957.

Robert McKinney To Represent U. S. on Atomic Energy Board

The President on September 19 appointed Robert M. McKinney to be Representative of the United States on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. (For biographic details, see press release 530 dated September 19.)

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

ECE Committee on Electric Power

The Department of State announced on September 20 (press release 534) that John E. Corette, president and general manager of the Montana Power Company, Butte, Mont., has been designated the U.S. Delegate to the 15th session of the Committee on Electric Power of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, which is to convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on October 10.

This Committee is one of the principal subsidiary bodies of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe and will celebrate its 10th anniversary during the coming session. It studies such matters as questions relating to the transfer of electric energy across frontiers and problems of rural electrification and energy problems.

Mr. Corette will also serve as principal spokesman for the United States at the 5th session of the Committee's working party on rural electrification, which will meet at Geneva October 7 to 9.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.

Ratifications deposited: Morocco, Nicaragua, and Yugoslavia, September 17, 1957; Monaco, September 19, 1957.

Cultural Relations

Convention for the promotion of inter-American cultural relations. Signed at Caracas March 28, 1954. Entered into force February 18, 1955.¹

Ratified by the President: September 16, 1957.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

Acceptance deposited: Cuba, September 6, 1957.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signature and acceptance: Ghana, September 20, 1957.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and acceptance: Ghana, September 20, 1957.

Fur Seals

Interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals. Signed at Washington February 9, 1957.²

Ratifications deposited: United States and Canada, September 16, 1957.

Postal Services

Convention of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, final protocol, and regulations of execution.

¹Not in force for the United States.

²Not in force.

Signed at Bogotá November 9, 1955. Entered into force March 1, 1956. TIAS 3653.

Ratification deposited: Ecuador, August 6, 1957.
Agreement relative to parcel post, final protocol, and regulations of execution of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. Signed at Bogotá November 9, 1955. Entered into force March 1, 1956. TIAS 3654.

Ratification deposited: Ecuador, August 6, 1957.
Agreement relative to money orders and final protocol of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. Signed at Bogotá November 9, 1955. Entered into force March 1, 1956. TIAS 3655.

Ratification deposited: Ecuador, August 6, 1957.

Refugees

Constitution of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. Adopted at Venice October 19, 1953. Entered into force November 30, 1954. TIAS 3197.

Acceptance deposited: Union of South Africa, October 1, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955.

Ratification deposited: United States, September 17, 1957.

BILATERAL

Mexico

Agreement for a cooperative meteorological program in Mexico. Effectuated by exchange of notes at México August 23 and 29, 1957. Entered into force August 29, 1957.

Portugal

Agreement amending research reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 21, 1955 (TIAS 3317). Signed at Washington June 7, 1957. *Entered into force:* September 19, 1957 (date on which each government received from the other written notification that it had complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to the sale to the United Kingdom for sterling of citrus fruit. Effectuated by exchange of notes at London June 27, 1957. Entered into force June 27, 1957.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Ceremony Marks 175th Anniversary of First Use of Great Seal

Press release 522 dated September 16

Acting Secretary Murphy on September 16 participated in a ceremony marking the 175th anniversary of the earliest known use of the Great Seal

of the United States. This ceremony took place on the north mezzanine of the main State Department building. Here the original Great Seal, with its press and cabinet, are housed in a glass-walled room as part of a permanent exhibit on the history and use of the seal. To emphasize the importance of the Great Seal as the historic symbol of national sovereignty, Mr. Murphy impressed it on four documents previously signed by the President.

The four documents to which Mr. Murphy affixed the seal were: (a) the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, signed at Caracas March 28, 1954, approved by the Senate August 8, 1957, and ratified by the President on September 16; (b) a commission promoting Walter N. Walmsley, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, to the class of Career Minister in the Foreign Service of the United States; (c) an exequatur—that is, an instrument recognizing the official status of a foreign consular officer accredited to the U.S. Government—to Kwee Djie Hoo as Consul General of Indonesia at New York; and (d) the annual proclamation of the President making October 11 the day commemorating the death of Gen. Casimir Pulaski.

The earliest impression of the seal was made on September 16, 1782, 175 years ago, on a document signed by John Hanson, President of the Continental Congress, and countersigned by Charles Thomson, Secretary of the Congress. This document is a full power authorizing General Washington to arrange with the British for the exchange, subsistence, and better treatment of prisoners of war. The document, together with various other documents of both early and recent date bearing the Great Seal, forms part of the permanent exhibit on the mezzanine of the main State Department building.

The story of the Great Seal actually begins with the first day of the independence of the United States. On July 4, 1776, after voting the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, the Continental Congress recognized the need for an official symbol of the sovereignty of the new nation by appointing a committee "to bring in a device for a seal for the United States." This committee consisted of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson.

Actually, however, the development of a suitable design for the seal took 6 years, the efforts of two more committees, and further work by William Barton and Charles Thomson, who became the principal authors of the device. By a resolution of June 20, 1782, the Continental Congress adopted the design for the Great Seal. There have been seven dies of the seal cut since 1782, but the present one is an exact copy of the original design.

By an act of Congress of September 15, 1789, which changed the name of the "Department of Foreign Affairs" to the "Department of State," the seal adopted on June 20, 1782, was declared to be the seal of the United States and the Secretary of State was made its custodian. That act specified that the seal should be affixed "to all civil commissions, for officers of the United States, to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or by the President alone," and also to various other unspecified instruments or acts.

In the early days of the Department of State the seal was used on documents of all the types on which it is used today and on documents of some other types as well. The changing and expanding functions of the Federal Government have necessitated the curtailment from time to time—usually by act of Congress or Executive order—of the extent of the use of the seal. Among documents which formerly but no longer pass under the seal are patents for inventions, pardons or commutations of sentence for persons convicted of crimes against the laws of the United States, ships' passports and sea letters, and commissions to private armed vessels to cruise in time of war against the enemies of the United States. Where formerly the seal was affixed to all civil (not military or naval) commissions signed by the President, now persons appointed to serve under Cabinet officers other than the Secretary of State are commissioned under the seals of the respective departments. Except for certain proclamations and the commissions of some civil officers, the seal is now used only on documents pertaining to international affairs.

While the original Great Seal is in the custody of the Secretary of State and its use is strictly guarded by law, every American is well acquainted with its symbolic design. The design of the seal is reproduced on all the one-dollar bills now in circulation, on stationery and publications of the

Federal Government, on Army and Air Force officers' service caps and Army uniform buttons, on certain public buildings and monuments, and at every American diplomatic and consular post throughout the world.

Mr. Murphy affixed the seal to 4 of the 7 different types of official documents on which the Great Seal is still regularly used: a civil commission, an instrument of ratification of a treaty, an exequatur, and a proclamation. The other types of documents that now take the seal are: full powers to negotiate and sign treaties or certain other agreements, presidential warrants for the extradition of fugitives from the justice of the United States, and envelopes enclosing letters of credence, letters of recall, or other autograph letters from the President to heads of foreign governments.¹

Foreign Service Examination

The Department of State announced on September 16 (press release 526) that the annual Foreign Service officer examination will be given on December 9, 1957, in approximately 65 centers throughout the United States. This examination is open to all who meet the age and citizenship requirements.

Some of the successful Foreign Service officer candidates will take up duties at the 275 American embassies, legations, and consulates around the world. At these posts, which range in size from the large missions such as Paris and London to the one-man posts such as Perth, Australia, the new officer may expect to do a variety of tasks, including administrative work; political, economic, commercial, and labor reporting; consular duties; and assisting and protecting Americans and protecting U.S. property abroad. Other new officers will be assigned to the Department's headquarters in Washington, where they will engage in research or other substantive work, or in the many administrative tasks which are essential to the day-to-day conduct of our foreign affairs.

Those successful in the 1-day written examination, which tests the candidate's facility in English expression, general ability, and background, as well as his proficiency in a modern foreign language, will subsequently be given an oral examina-

¹ For a reproduction of the seal, see BULLETIN of Sept. 16, 1957, p. 456.

tion by panels which will meet in regional centers throughout the United States. Those candidates who pass the oral test will then be given a physical examination and a security investigation. Upon completion of these phases, the candidate will be nominated by the President as a Foreign Service officer of class 8, vice consul, and secretary in the diplomatic service.

To be eligible to take the examination, candidates must be at least 20 years of age and under 31, as of October 28, 1957, and must also be American citizens of at least 9 years' standing. Although a candidate's spouse need not be a citizen on the date of the examination, citizenship must have been obtained prior to the date of the officer's appointment.

Starting salaries for successful candidates range from \$4,750 to \$5,350 per year, depending upon the age, experience, and family status of the individual. In addition, insurance, medical, educational, and retirement benefits are granted, as well as annual and sick leave.

Application forms may be obtained by writing to the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. The closing date for filing the application is October 28, 1957.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956-June 1957. Documents. Pub. 6505. Near and Middle Eastern Series 25. xiv, 425 pp. \$1.50.

A publication presenting the highlights of major developments in the Middle East, including the hostilities in Egypt, and showing not only how the United States reacted to these developments but also how important new elements were added to American policy toward the Middle East in general.

Mutual Understanding in the Nuclear Age. Pub. 6508. International Information and Cultural Series 56. 42 pp. 20¢.

A pamphlet containing valuable information about the

activities of the international educational exchange program during 1956.

Mutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 3822. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Belgium, amending annex B of agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels April 15 and May 9, 1957. Entered into force May 9, 1957.

Trade—Films. TIAS 3829. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Bonn April 26, 1956. Entered into force August 17, 1957.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Facilities Assistance Program. TIAS 3849. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Iraq. Exchange of notes—Signed at Baghdad June 16, 1957. Entered into force June 16, 1957.

Trade. TIAS 3851. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, supplementing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of October 30, 1947—Signed at Washington June 27, 1957. Schedule applied June 29, 1957.

Defense—Loan of Vessels and Small Craft to Germany. TIAS 3852. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bonn April 30 and May 1, 1957. Entered into force May 1, 1957.

Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights. TIAS 3853. 34 pp. 15¢.

Treaty between the United States of America and Iran—Signed at Tehran August 15, 1955. Entered into force June 16, 1957.

Trade. TIAS 3854. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America, Belgium, Acting for the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, and the Netherlands, supplementing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of October 30, 1947—Signed at Washington June 27, 1957, and related exchanges of notes. Schedule applied June 29, 1957.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Equipment, Materials, Services, and Other Assistance. TIAS 3855. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Lebanon. Exchange of notes—Signed at Beirut June 3 and 6, 1957. Entered into force June 6, 1957.

Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 3856. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Paraguay—Signed at Asunción April 4, 1957. Entered into force June 26, 1957.

Military Assistance. TIAS 3857. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Libya—Signed at Tripoli June 30, 1957. Entered into force June 30, 1957.

Military Assistance—Disposition of Equipment and Materials. TIAS 3858. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Libya, implementing article I, paragraph 3, of agreement of June 30, 1957—Signed at Tripoli June 30, 1957. Entered into force June 30, 1957.

Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 3859. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Peru, modifying agreement of May 3, 1956, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima March 11 and June 13, 1957. Entered into force June 13, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Drought Relief Assistance. TIAS 3860. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington July 16 and 19, 1957. Entered into force July 19, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3861. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines—Signed at Manila June 25, 1957. Entered into force June 25, 1957.

Military Bases in the Philippines—Manila Air Station. TIAS 3862. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila June 18, 1957, and related exchange of notes. Entered into force June 18, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Child Feeding Program. TIAS 3863. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Tunisia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tunis June 28, 1957. Entered into force June 28, 1957.

Sockeye and Pink Salmon Fisheries. TIAS 3867. 6 pp. 5¢.

Protocol between the United States of America and Canada, amending convention of May 28, 1930—Signed at Ottawa December 28, 1956. Entered into force July 3, 1957.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 16-22

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press release issued prior to September 16 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 519 of September 14.

No.	Date	Subject
†520	9/16	Income-tax convention with U.K.
†521	9/16	Income-tax convention with Belgium.
522	9/16	175th anniversary of Great Seal.
†523	9/16	Income-tax protocol with U.K.
524	9/16	Renegotiation of certain tariff concessions.
525	9/16	Germany expands claims coverage.
526	9/16	Foreign Service officer examination (rewrite).
527	9/17	Winter Olympic Games.
528	9/18	Dulles: article for <i>Foreign Affairs</i> magazine.
529	9/19	Dulles: U.N. General Assembly.
*530	9/19	McKinney appointed U.S. Representative on IAEA (biographic details).
531	9/19	Air transport consultations with Brazil.
532	9/20	NATO fellowship and scholarship program.
*533	9/20	McKinney sworn in.
534	9/20	ECE Committee on Electric Power (rewrite).
*535	9/20	Educational exchange.
536	9/20	Anniversary of death of Nikola Petkov.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

American Principles. Challenge and Response in United States Policy (Dulles)			
Atomic Energy			
Robert M. McKinney To Represent U.S. on Atomic Energy Board	569	Hungary. The United Nations: Its Issues and Responsibility (Wilcox)	
The United Nations: Its Issues and Responsibility (Wilcox)	586	Immigration and Naturalization. U.S. To Waive Fingerprinting of Winter Olympics Participants (Dulles)	
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Can the United Nations do anything about disarmament?

What do the United Nations aid programs—like the technical assistance program and the United Nations Children's Fund—have to do with world peace?

How much does our membership in the United Nations cost?

Answers to these and other frequently heard questions regarding the United Nations are given by Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Representative to the United Nations, in an illustrated pamphlet recently issued by the Department of State. Twenty-five questions in all are considered in the 40-page publication, which is printed in question-and-answer format.

Copies of *You . . . and the United Nations, 1957* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for 20 cents each.

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